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Spectacles of Emancipation: Reading Rights
Differently in India's Legal Discourse
OISHIK SIRCAR *
How does neo-liberatism change the way we understand rights, law, and justice? With postcoloniat
and post-Liberalization India as its focal point, this article attempts to disrupt the linear,
progressive equation that holds that more laws equals more rights equals more justice. This
is an equation that has informed and been informed by fundamental rights jurisprudence and
law reform, the enactment of legislation to guarantee socio-economic rights, and many of
the strategies of social movement activism in contemporary India. This article argues that while
these developments have indeed proliferated a public culture of rights, they have simultaneously
been accompanied by the militarization of the state and the privatization of state accountability.
The result is a cruet paradox in which rights operate as spectacles that make the poor
and the disadvantaged continue to repose faith in their emancipatory potential white the
managerial and militarized state uses these spectacles to normalize its monopoly over violence.
By looking at selected literary, legal, popular, and subaltern texts, the article proposes a
radical reimagination of emancipation that is not trapped in the liberal narrative of rights,
but rather is embedded in and embodied by the everyday and ordinary struggles of the poor.
En quoi Le n6oLibralisme change-t-il La facon dont nous comprenons Les droits, le droit et La
justice? En se penchant sur l'6poque post-Lib~ralisation de L'Inde postcotoniate, cet
article tente d'6branler l'6quation lin6aire progressive voutant qu'un plus grand nombre de
Lois entraine un plus grand nombre de droits et par cons6quent plus de justice. Cette 6qua-
tion repose sur Ia jurisprudence des droits fondamentaux et la r6.forme du droit, [adoption
de Lois visant 6 garantir Les droits socio-6conomiques et de nombreuses strategies de
l'activisme social de L'Inde contemporaine, et 'inspire 5 son tour. Cet article fait valoir que
bien que ces d6veLoppements aient effectivement diss6min6 dans le public une culture des
Doctoral student, Melbourne Law School and Honorary Research Fellow, Collaborative
Research Programme on Law, Postcoloniality and Culture, Jindal Global Law School (JGLS),
India. Formerly, Assistant Professor, JGLS. I am grateful to Osgoode Hall Law School, Jindal
Global Law School, and Calcutta Research Group for funding the research for this paper.
'Thanks are due to Prabhakar Singh for his close readings, to Amit Bindal for access to valuable
references, and to the anonymous referees for their very useful comments. I dedicate this essay
to Professor Ranabir Samaddar for the faith he has reposed in me through all these years. I have
learned enormously from his critical generosity and remain inspired by his commitment to not
letting the ephemerality of culture trump the materiality of politics. All errors remain mine.
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droits, ils se sont accompagn6s de La militarisation de I'tat et de [a privatisation de La
responsabitisation de tltat. IL en a d~couL6 un paradoxe cruel seton LequeL Les droits agissent
comme un prisme qui fait que Les personnes pauvres et d~savantag~es continuent de croire en
teur potentiel d'6mancipatioh, alors que .ttat gestionnaire et mi!itaris6 A travers ce mbme
prisme normalise son monopole sur [a violence. En examinant certains textes choisis titt6raires,
juridiques, popuLaires et subalternes, cet article propose de jeter un nouveau regard radical
sur !.'mancipation qui ne reste pas prisonnier de [a narration Iib~rate des droits, mais qui fait
ptut6t partie intbgrante des luttes quotidiennes ordinaires des pauvres.
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I. USTAD MANGU'S FAITH AND FATE
The new constitution is going to be like boiling hot water is to bugs who suck
the blood of the poor... .'
MANGU THE TONGAWALA (horse-cart driver) is the protagonist in Saadat Hasan
Manto's short story "The New Constitution."2 The story is set in 1935 in Lahore
in what was then the undivided Indian subcontinent. The satirical provocations
in this humorous story are an apt preface to concerns that I wish to share and
explore in this essay.
Because of his ability to wax eloquent on anything under the sun, Mangu
was endearingly given the salutary title of Ustad (the Great One) by his fellow
tongawalas. Ustad Mangu hated the British. Once after getting into an argu-
ment-with a drunken gora (white man) who was abusing him, Mangu told one
of his friends:
I am sick and tired of these offshoots of monkeys. ... Every time I look at their
blighted faces, my blood begins to boil in my veins. We need a new law to get rid of
these people. Only that can revive us, I swear on your life.3
1. Saadat Hasan Manto, "The New Constitution" in Khalid Hasan, ed, Bitter Fruit: The Very
Best ofSaadat Hasan Manto (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008) 206 at 209.
2. Ibid at 206-15.
3. Ibid at 207-08 [emphasis added].
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Ustad Mangu's faith in the imaginary power of law to end colonial oppression and
resist the colonizer was strengthened when he heard two of his passengers talk
about the Government of India Act, 19351 (the precursor to the Constitution of
India (Constitution)5) to be passed on 1 April, which was only a few days away.
The news about the new constitution elated Ustad Mangu-he just could not
control his excitement and wanted to get back to his tonga stand as soon as
possible and share it with his friends:
He was very happy. A delightful cool settled over his heart when he thought of how
the new constitution would send these white mice (he always called them by that
name) scurrying back into their holes for all times to come.
6
As 1 April approached, he overheard good and bad things about the new
constitution from his passengers, but his belief in its transformative potential
remained unshaken:
The new constitution ... appeared to him to be something bright and full of promise.
The only thing he could compare the new constitution with was the splendid brass
and gilt fittings he had purchased after careful examination a couple of years ago ....
When the fittings were new, the nickel-headed nails would shimmer and where brass
had been worked into the fittings it shone like gold. On the basis of that analogy ...
it was essential that the new constitution should shine and glow.
7
On 1 April, Ustad Mangu woke up early and took his tonga out for business
with an irrepressible thrill in his demeanor. He decorated his horse's head with a
new plume to celebrate the birth of the new constitution. He tried to spot newness in
everything he saw. However, except for the new plume made of colourful feathers,
everything looked old. He was not disappointed and told himself that as the day
progressed things would look different.
Sometime later, he heard someone call out to him. Mangu turned around to
find that it was the same gora he once had an argument with. A feeling of intense
hatred grew in his heart, and he wanted to go away without responding to his
call. But he controlled his anger and turned his tonga around-he did not want
to miss the fare, and he had no reason to fear the British on 1 April. He stopped
the tonga, gave the gora a defiant look, and, emboldened by the promise of liberation
that the new constitution would usher in, quoted five rupees for the trip. Without
intending to get into a confrontation with Ustad Mangu, the gora raised his cane
4. Government of India Act, 1935 (UK), 25 & 26 Geo V, c 42.
5. India Const, 1950, art 366(25) [India Const].
6. Manto, supra note 1 at 209.
7. Ibid at 210.
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and instructed him to move so that he could board the tonga. In this gesture, the
cane touched Mangu's thigh a few times. In response, Mangu landed a powerful
blow on the gora's chin. The gora was taken by utter surprise but could not do
anything to save himself. Mangu kept at his blows and screamed:
"The same cockiness even on 1 April! Well, sonny boy, it is our Raj now." A crowd
gathered ... [and he declared to them:] "Those days are gone, friends, when they
ruled the roost. There is a new constitution now, fellows, a new constitution.8
Two policemen emerged from the crowd, rescued the gora, and took Ustad
Mangu away to the police station. The closing lines of the story are telling:
All along the way, and even inside the station, he kept screaming, "New constitu-
tion, new constitution!" but nobody paid any attention to him. "New constitution,
new constitution! What rubbish are you talking? It's the same old constitution." And
he was locked up.
9
Ustad Mangu's faith and fate sets up the metaphor of what I call "spectacles
of emancipation," which is the gap between the vision of emancipation that the
law promises and the reality of violence that the law performs. Faith in the law
emerges from two sources: one is the lived experience of knowing that the law
delivers justice; the other is the perception of the law as justice.1" This article will
attempt to disrupt the linear, progressive equation that holds that more laws
equals more rights equals more justice. This is an equation that has informed
and been informed by fundamental rights jurisprudence and law reform, the
enactment of legislation to guarantee socio-economic rights, and many of the
strategies of social movement activism in India. My goal is not to disparage or
to dismiss the law. That would be both an exercise in futility, given the hope
that people's struggles rest in the law, and intellectually dishonest, given my own
contingent belief in the ability of the law to at least deliver a semblance
of justice. Rather, I aim to better understand how the spectacles of law's
emancipatory potential are accompanied by an anesthetization of the subalterns
resistance through the deployment of governmental tactics that discipline conduct,
not by using overt coercion but by cajoling consent out of the subaltern with the
promise of welfare.
8. Ibid at 214.
9. Ibid at 215.
10. Oishik Sircar, "The Fallacy of Equality: 'Anti-Citizens', Sexual Justice and the Law in India"
in Ashok Agrwaal & Bharat Bushan, eds, Justice and Law: The Limits of the Deliverables of
Law, vol 2 (New Delhi: SAGE, 2009) 210 at 210.
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Ustad Mangu's comparison of the new constitution to the glittering nickel
and brass fittings on his tonga was the spectacularized image of what the new law
promised to deliver. His unshakeable belief operated as a psychological anesthetic,
preventing him from understanding that the Government of India Act, 1935 was
actually an "imperial event."" It merely permitted limited self-government to
Indians at the local and provincial levels and guaranteed no rights to colonized
subjects. Without a bill of rights, the new constitution allowed the British
government to take back total control whenever the need arose. But the impact of
this anesthesia did not last long, and bolstered by the strength of the new law, Ustad
Mangu exercised a corporeal act of rebellion. The consequence was incarceration
and a reminder that despite the new constitution, nothing had changed.
This story is an important "lesson in the discrepancy between subaltern
struggles and bourgeois aspirations."12 The constitution's birth served as the
aspirational markers for civilization, sovereignty, and the rule of law for the
nationalist Indian elite. But for the subaltern, it was a blinding spectacle. As
Aamir Mufti puts it in his reading of the short-story:
Manto highlights the differing relationships between the subaltern and the bour-
geois nationalists to colonial political 'reform'. Half understanding [or blinded by]
*the nationalist interpretation of the law, the subaltern is willing to act and claim the
new dignity and status ('citizen') he thinks it is promising him, only to be roundly
disabused by that illusion.'
3
In postcolonial India the narrative of the law's relationship with the subaltern
remains as fraught with contradictions as it was during Mangu's time. Manto's
story sets up a pithy challenge to the spectacularization of constitutionalism-
rule of law, development, democracy-as the panacea not only for injustices, but
also for the so-called unreasonable demands of 'unruly' populations who conduct
their engagement with the state on their own terms, rather than on the civic-legal
terms that the state demands. The constitution ends up serving a pacifying,
de-politicizing role in achieving the promise of emancipation.
In this article I will show how the constitutional framework that is used to
claim and gain guarantees to fundamental rights is being compromised through
the use of the very same constitution and the courts. The poor place faith in the
11. Andrew Muldoon, Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act: Last Act of the Raj
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2009) at 3.
12. Aamir R Mufti, "A Greater Story-Writer Than God: Genre, Gender and Minority in Late
Colonial India" in Partha Chatterjee & Pradeep Jeganathan, eds, Community Gender and
Violence: Subaltern Studies XI (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) at 21.
13. Ibid at 22.
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law to deliver them' from injustice, and the law holds them captive while they
are without rights. The cruelty of this experience is aptly captured in the term
Pharmakon. The Derridian reading 1 of this expression, first introduced by Plato,
means medicine that is cure and poison at the same time. This is precisely what
makes negotiating law's spectacular promises of justice both an unsettling and
exasperating experience for the subaltern.
Faith in the spectacle of legal justice and the resultant fate of the rightsless bear
cruelly disproportionate outcomes. Using spectacles to represent emancipation and
justice is a necessary tactic of liberal statecraft and marketcraft, both of which
operate through a seamless intersection of managerial and militarized agendas.
This tactic makes us believe in the benevolence of the state towards citizens, in
the commitment of the state to national security, in the ideals of constitutionalism
and the rule of law, and, of course, in human rights. It bolsters our faith in the
constitution and the judiciary as the ultimate source, giver, arbiter, and interpreter
of rights and makes us look at law as the primary legitimizing discourse concerning
rights and emancipation. Spectacles of constitutionalism work as a process of
mobilizing and sustaining what Upendra Baxi calls the "will to stateness," a "total-
izing formation ' s in which legal recognition of communities and rights postures
as the telos of justice-seeking enterprises within liberalism. In so doing, spectacles
ofconstitutionalism put constitutional law on a hallowed pedestal worshipped by
the state, the market, and citizens alike.
The themes of promise and performance of law as an emancipatory tool, on
the one hand, and the law as tool of domination and emancipation, on the other,
have been explored in the Indian context in great depth by many scholars across
disciplines. This article does not rehearse those arguments and does not claim to
make any path-breaking revelations on that front. Rather, this article attempts to
identify some of the emancipatory incantations at work in contemporary India.
In so doing, this article establishes an argument about the ways in which the law's
spectacle works to maintain the rightsless citizens' continuous faith in the state
(and now the market)-even as they are left disappointed by the constitution's
promises of emancipation.
Commenting on this "double vision" and what I would call a double bind of
the law's position in Indian society, Marc Galanter wrote in a 1983 essay:
14. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, translated by Barbara Johnson (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1981) at 61-172.
15. Upendra Baxi, "The (Im)possibility of Constitutional Justice: Seismographic Notes on
Indian Constitutionalism" in Zoya Hasan, E Sridharan & R Sudarshan, eds, India's Living
Constitution: Ideas, Practices, Controversies (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002) 31 at 32.
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India is a society in which law (in the conventional sense of authoritative general
rules propounded by official agencies) is called upon to play a major role in
maintaining order, effectuating social control, implementing deliberate change, and
adjusting the accompanying strains and tensions ... In its adherence to legal forms
and loyalty to legal procedures, India is quite unusual among third world countries.
Upon closer observation, this reliance upon and loyalty to law turns out to be more
ambiguous than it first appears. In place of the image of India as a Rechtsstaat, we
might substitute a double vision in which law in India is at once elaborated but
attenuated, pervasive but precarious.
16
In India today-when we have recendy marked six decades of the Constitution
with much fanfare-the double vision persists. But the image of India as a
Rechtsstaat has not subsided; rather, it has only strengthened. In contradistinction
to Galanter's observation, which was made close to three decades ago, the idea
of rule of law in India today is elaborate and pervasive; the state, in a mode of
legislative overdrive, projects new laws and law reform as primary forms of good
governance. What have become attenuated and precarious are the entitlements
and lives of the marginalized.
The advent of the politically-organized liberalization of the indian economy
in 1991 and the accompanying privatization of the socio-political practices
of statecraft and citizenship have given emancipation a whole new meaning in
which promises of emancipation do not remain the privileged preserve of the
state and Constitution alone. The ostensible power to create and determine access
to human rights is being championed as rigorously, if not more, by the market,
and we are all invited to participate. In a traditional Rechtsstaat polity, governmental
power is limited by the law and by the constitution. In the Rechtsstaas post- 1991
avatar in India, power is further limited by the market. The abrogation of state
accountability is accompanied by increasing state withdrawal, and this state of affairs
is thought to be most conducive for the flourishing of liberal ideals of emancipation.
It is useful to quote Baxi at length in this context:
What is new ... about contemporary economic globalization is that it encases the Indian
constitution within the emergent paradigm of global economic constitutionalism. This
paradigm creates many-sided impacts, principal among which is the transformations of
notions of accountability/responsibiity The Indian state ... is placed in a situation where
internationally assumed (or imposed) obligations to facilitate the flows of global capital,
trade and investment command a degree of priority over the order of constitutional
obligations owed to Indian citizens and peoples. The three Ds of economic rationalism (de-
regulation, disinvestment, and denationalization), for example, favour many development
policies that threaten, and at times nullify, achievements of rights and justice discourse.
17
16. "Making Law Work for the Oppressed" (1983) 3 The Other Side 9.
17. Baxi, supra note 15 at 41 [emphasis added].
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I would actually go a step further than Baxi to contend that the three Ds
of economic rationalism operate as spectacles that lead us to believe that they
strengthen the rights and justice discourse rather than nullifying it. Global
Economic Constitutionalism (GEC)-the practice of constitutionalism using the
logic of neo-liberalism' 8---operates as a history-vanishing moment or as what David
Kazanjian, in a different context, refers to as a "flashpoint": "a centripetal turbulence
of illumination so powerful that it may blind the past even as it spotlights the
present and lights up the future."19 This history-vanishing moment blinds us to
the contested and insurgent origins of our Constitution and the cultures of dissent
that have shaped our constitutional character. The pre-Independence, anti-colonial
struggles and the post-Independence struggles by subaltern populations are
considered aberrations in public memory and are not counted as contributions to
the making of India's constitutional democracy.2" As this article tries to show, the
celebratory march of the nation from a colonized country to a neo-liberal power
that is responding commendably to the global demands of economic restructuring
is the only narrative of history that the courts have been responding to.
In other words, the logic of GEC, to invoke Susan George, "gives the
impression that all people from all regions of the globe are somehow caught up in
a single movement, an all embracing phenomenon and are all marching towards
some future Promised Land."2 The image of this future "Promised Land," I argue
18. A definition of neo-liberalism that I wish to work with is by David Harvey, who writes:
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights,
free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional
framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality
and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures
and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be,
the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land,
water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be
created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture.
See A BriefHistory of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 2. For a detailed
account of the consequences of the spread of neo-liberalism globally, see Naomi Klein, The
Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Toronto: Alfred A Knopf Canada, 2007).
19. See Jasbir K Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2007) at xviii.
20. Hasan, Sridharan & Sudarshan, supra note 15; Partha Chatterjee, ed, State and Politics in
India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Ranabir Samaddar, The Materiality of Politics:
The Technologies of Rule, vol 1 (London: Anthem Press, 2007); and Ranabir Samaddar, The
Materiality of Politics: Subject Positions in Politics, vol 2 (London: Anthem Press, 2007).
21. "Globalizing Rights?" in Matthew J Gibney, Globalizing Rights (Oxford: Oxford University
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in this article, is scripted by the liberal rights discourse of the Indian Constitu-
tion and the courts as one that is secular, nationalist, heterosexual, meritorious,
multicultural, and market-friendly; it is one that will effectively remedy inequality,
subordination, exclusion, and annihilation. As a history-vanishing moment, this
works to depoliticize histories of struggles that upset the neatness with which the
celebratory and linear narratives of the journey from repression to emancipation
operate in Indias post-liberalization legal and judicial discourse. 22
My signification of these phenomena through the expression 'spectacle' is
borrowed from the work of French situationist Guy Debord. Debord, in his
influential The Society of the Spectacle, refers to "spectacle" as the accumulation of
capital to the point of collapse, where capital itself becomes an image.2 1 In this
article, I argue that the idea of emancipation has become a spectacle-a site of
accumulation and commodification.2 1 I attempt to illustrate how 'products' (in
this case judgments or laws that promise emancipation for rightsless peoples)
are forms of spectacle that ensure their sustenance as landmark precedents, without
doing much to dismantle the structural causes of rightslessness. Spectacles can
ascribe excess value to the law or judgment in question. Akin to Debord's
idea of "commodity fetishism"-in this case judgment or legislation fetishism-
spectacles seduce people into believing that judgments are cultural markers of
legitimate recognition of injustice for the disenfranchised. Spectacles effected
through ostensibly emancipatory judgments or laws are a tactic through which
people's struggles against injustices are pacified and depoliticized.
The article explores some ideas about how the miscegenation between the
state and the market creates technologies through which the Rechtsstaat image
of India is produced, consumed, and sustained. The article also highlights the
ways in which assemblages and deployment of the liberal language of legal rights
creates spectacles that make the rightsless believe in the state-and then, inescapably,
in the market-to deliver them their economized share of emancipation.
Press, 2003) 15 at 16.
22. On modernity, the violence of modern constitutionalism, and its connection to colonialism
and imperialism, see Upendra Baxi, "Constitutionalism as a Site of State Formative
Practices" (2000) 21 Cardozo L Rev 1183. He writes, "Much of the business of 'modern'
constitutionalism was transacted during the early halcyon days of colonialism/imperialism.
That historical timespace marks a combined and uneven development of the world in the
processes of early modernity. ... [C]onstitutionalism inherits the propensity for violent social
exclusion from the 'modern"' (at 1184-85).
23. Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black & Red, 1993).
24. Cindi Katz, "Childhood as Spectacle: Relays of Anxiety and the Reconfiguration of the
Child" (2008) 15 Cultural Geographies 5 at 5.
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'The scope for this paper is restricted to the years between 2000 and 2010. I
make brief references to a select set of judgments, legislation, activist strategies,
and privatized representations of emancipation from this time period to further
my argument about how these operate as spectacles that have the ability to
discipline the ways in which we memorialize justice. The truncated timeline and
sources have been selected to signify a dense period in the history of contemporary
India, one in which "critical events"2" have collided and converged, giving the
polity a unique hybridity that has blurred the line between state and market.
It is necessary to note that this blurring has not diluted the position of power
that state or the market wield; however, when critically examined, it exposes
the intimate way in which they collude to simultaneously promise emancipation
and maintain monopoly over violence. This article makes a modest attempt at
mapping the contours of this disciplinary tactic, which operates as the leitmotif
of democratic and juridical governance in India today.
II. GLIMPSES INTO INDIA'S SPECTACULAR PRESENT
Before I get into the thick of conceptually unpacking the aforementioned arguments,
it is necessary to consider some of the contemporary manifestations of the Mangu
experience in postcolonial India. The illustrations that I share below are merely
indicative of the trend I am trying to identify.
For the first example, imagine that Ustad Mangu is a homosexual person in
a post-section 377 scenario26 who, drawing strength from the Delhi High Court's
decision to decriminalize sodomy in Naz Foundation v Govt of NCT of Delhi
and others," openly declares his sexual orientation. He would surely not escape
societal stigma. Stigma attached to sexual minorities continues to be legitimized
through the legal excess in constructing a public culture of homophobia that
section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 18608 has embedded in our socio-political
and cultural consciousness.29 The state can and does continue to use a plethora of
25. Veena Das, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995). Borrowing from Francois Furet, Das characterizes "critical
events" as those that institute "a new modality of historical action which was not inscribed in
the inventory of that situation" (at 5) [emphasis in original].
26. Section 377 is the anti-sodomy provision in the Indian Penal Code of 1860, which was
read-down by the Delhi High Court on 2 July 2009. This judgment decriminalized sodomy
between consensual adults, in private.
27. [2009] WP(C) No.7455/2001 (H Ct Delhi) [Naz Foundation].
28. Act 45 of 1860, India Code.
29. The argument that the very existence of section 377 on the law books for over 150 years
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other laws, including the Police Act,3" Railways Act,31 and public nuisance laws, to
target the sexually marginalized. The case of Doctor Siras from the Aligargh Muslim
University (AMU)-who was secretly filmed in an act of consensual sex with
another adult man in the confines of his residence and whose employment was
then terminated by the university authorities-is a rude reminder of the fact that
nothing has changed, despite the judgment. A cruel consequence of this incident
was that Doctor Siras was found dead under mysterious circumstances a few days
after the Allahabad High Court ordered.AMU to reinstate his appointment.
32
In a similar vein, imagine that we substitute Ustad Mangu with Doctor
Binayak Sen, Arun Fereira, or Soni Sori-just a few of the many human rights
defenders in India who were or are in jail because of their alleged anti-national
activities. 33 We realize the limitations inherent in the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech, due process, and the right to life and liberty. It does not take
much state strength to keep individuals incarcerated despite flimsy evidence or
to subject them to torture in the name of extraordinariness under special security
laws (such as the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 200534). Such
laws effect a return to emergency-like conditions in present day India and
establish a normalized order of "Gulag constitutionalism" that "represents dissent
"135
as treason ....
in India has normalized non-legal forms of homophobia and discriminations against
homosexuals and other sexually marginalized persons draws on Ryan Goodman's work on
South Africa in which it was shown that despite the South African Constitution's recognition
of the right against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, homophobia continues
in ways that the law cannot detect or prosecute. See "Beyond the Enforcement Principle:
Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics" (2001) 89 Cal L Rev 643 at 651-53.
30. No 5 of 1861, India Code.
31. No 24 of 1989, India Code.
32. Urvashi Sarkar, "Mystery shrouds death of AMU professor" The Hindu (8 April 2010),
online: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article391265.ece>. Manjari Mishra,
"Aligargh Muslim University professor suspended for being gay" The Times of India
(18 February 2010), online: <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com2010-02-18/
india/28118769_lshrinivas-ramchandra-siras-rickshaw-puller-amu-campus>.
33. The arrests and charges against those who have been released on bail were done on mere
suspicion based on either their work with indigenous people's movements and against
indiscriminate corporate mining, or their religion. A complete list of such 'prisoners of
conscience', who are presently in custody of the Indian state, is available online: "Fabricated.
in - National Campaign Against the Fabrication of False Cases" <http://www.fabricated.in>.
For testimonies by those who have been arrested and tortured under anti-terror laws in India,
see Preeti Verma, The terror ofPOTA and other security legislation in India (Delhi: Human
Rights Law Network, 2004).
34. No 14 of 2006, India Code.
35. Baxi, supra note 15 at 33.
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Likewise, consider that the fate of several victim-survivors of the Union
Carbide Corporation (UCC) explosion in Bhopal in 1984 has been sealed not
only by the cross-generational devastation that the explosion unleashed, but also
by the victim-survivors' committed attempt to place faith in the judiciary to
bring them justice. This has resulted in many activists, including women and
children, being arrested and brutally beaten by the police.36 In a show of paternalism,
immediately after the tragedy took place the state unilaterally decided to act as
parenspatriae for all victims; in so doing the state attempted to mask and escape
accountability for its own collusion in the event. To save itself from being made
tortiously liable in US courts by the many American personal injury lawyers
who flew in after the explosion, the state in its capacity as parenspatriae passed
the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 198511 to take over and
pursue the claims of the victims in and outside India, ostensibly because the
victims would not be able to do so. Non-state human rights groups and victims
themselves lost all legal standing to claim compensation. While this move seemed
as if the state was taking its obligations to remedy the violations faced by its citizens
seriously, in effect this enabled the state to evade responsibility by taking on the
persona of the victim. The constitutionality of the law was challenged but
ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court (SC). 38 The spectacle that this
benevolent posturing created overshadowed the state's plan both to allow Warren
Anderson, CEO and Chairman of UCC at the time of the disaster, safe passage
out of India and to save itself and UCC from being targeted by mass compensation
lawsuits. The case moved to the United States in 1986, but it was dismissed on
the ground offorum non conveniens. This dismissal worked well for UCC because
it meant that the case had to be tried in India where the law of compensation
for industrial disasters and corporate crimes was not well developed.39 The latest
travesty-taking the form of a judgment, issued on 7 June 2010, that criminally
convicted some of the accused of Union Carbide India Limited-pays mere lip
36. Greenpeace, Press Release, "Bhopal activists brutally assaulted and arrested for demanding
clean drinking water" (19 May 2005) online: <http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/news/
bhopal-activists-brutally-assa>; "Bhopal Activists Freed" BBC News (26 November 2002),
online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/2513883.stm>.
37. No21 of 1985, India Code.
38. Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India, [1990] AIR 148.
39. See Bridget Hanna, Ward Morehouse & Satinath Sarangi, The Bhopal Reader: Remembering
Twenty Years of the World's Worst Industrial Disaster (Goa: The Other India Press); M Galanter,
"Law's elusive promise: learning from Bhopal" in Michael Likosky, ed, Transnational Legal
Processes: Globalisation and Power Disparities (London: Butterworths Tolley, 2002) 172; Kim
Fortun, Advocacy After Bhopal: Environmentalism, Disaster, New Global Orders (London: The
University of Chicago Press, 2001).
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service to the cause of justice and reparation for which the Bhopalis have been
struggling for over twenty-five years now.
0
The impunity with which urban evictions continue in big cities in the name
of beautification, cleanliness, development, and now security (especially in the
wake of events like the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi) is another
instance of the abrogation of rights by the state at the demand of market
actors41 and of a modern-day Mangu-like experience. Even though the judgment
in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation 2 recognized that the homeless
have a constitutional right to shelter and livelihood, these evictions continue to
occur. The courts, showing more concern for the rights of privileged citizens
to drive on roads cleared of beggars and the homeless, have unapologetically
suffocated the expansive and pro-human rights interpretations given to the right
to life and liberty under Article 21 through a progressive history of judicial activism.
The violence unleashed by anti-poor judgments like Almitra H Patel v Union of
India3 has been a cause of celebration by elite citizens for whom homeless people
are encroachers and an eyesore to potential investors in Delhi. In this case,
while commenting on the government's policy of rehabilitating slum dwellers,
the SC remarked that "the promise of free land at the tax payers [sic] cost, in
place of a jhuggi [slum], is a proposal which attracts more land grabbers. Re-
warding an encroacher with free alternatives [sic] sites is like giving a reward to
a pickpocket."" As a commentator notes, "the likening of a slum-dweller to a
pickpocket was a definite statement of prejudice and contempt emanating from
the court."41 Over the past years, millions of slum dwellers from the Yamuna
Pushta and other Jhuggi colonies of Delhi have been removed on the orders of
the Supreme Court and rendered homeless or sent to Bawana without any
sanitation, water, electricity, or even drainage.46 The courts' allusion to 'development'
40. Karuna Nundy, "A Traffic Accident in Bhopal" 7he Hindu (9 June 2010), online:
<http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article450106.ece>.
41. Housing and Land Rights Network, The 2010 Commonwealth Games: Whose Wealth?
Whose Commons? by Shalini Mishra, Shivani Chaudhry & Miloon Kothari (New Delhi:
Housing and Land Rights Network, 2010).
42. [1985] AIR 180 at para 83.
43. [1998] 1 SCR 220 (India).
44. Ibid.
.45. Usha Ramanathan, "Of Judicial Power," Frontline 19:6 (March 2002) online: Frontline
<http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1906/19060300.htm>.
46. Prashant Bhushan, "The Judiciary: Cutting Edge of a Predator State" Counter Currents (7
December 2006), online: <http://countercurrents.org/hr-bhushan07l206.htm>; see also
Kalyani Menon-Sen & Gautam Bhan, Swept off the Map: Surviving Eviction and Resettlement
in Delhi (New Delhi: Yoda Press, 2008).
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in their decisions has been seen to represent their commitment to turning Delhi
into a world-class city; there has been little appreciation of the anti-poor positions
that have deeply informed the ideology behind these judgments.
As another illustration, the so-called socialist move to abolish a fundamental
right to private property was accompanied by the introduction of the principle of
eminent domain, which has allowed the state to acquire land for any public purpose.
The havoc that laws like the LandAcquisition Act, 189441 and the ForestAct, 19278
(until its new version came into being) have wreaked on the lives of Adivasi (Indig-
enous) communities does not need reiteration here. What is crucial about such a
move is that in the name of abolishing private property, the state turned itself into
the rightful owner of all landed property, which facilitated its unilateral decision to
acquire land whenever there was an industry-induced demand for it.
Yet another example is the recent enactment of the long-overdue Right of
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009' (RTE Act), which also
works as a spectacle. It guarantees something unprecedented in India's funda-
mental rights history-it translates for the first time a Directive Principle of State
Policy" not only into a fundamental right but also into legislation. However,
with respect to children beyond the age of fourteen, the state absolves itself of all
accountability to guarantee education. Only those with the economic capacity
to afford education beyond age fourteen can avail themselves of it; the rest must
be satisfied with this token guarantee. What is interesting is that along with the
enactment of the RTE Act, the state is also introducing the Foreign Education
Institutions (Regulation of Entry and Operations) Bill, 2010,51 which will allow a
complete takeover of higher education by private universities. Only those who
have the private capital to afford these universities will benefit-which is a
negligible proportion of university aspirants in India. 2 In other words, the
spectacle of the RTE Act is used as a convenient cover for the state to privatize
higher education.
Another example is the way in which the courts- avoid the issue of
structural exclusion in the hope that heightened forms of punishment will work
as spectacles to keep the disadvantaged happy about the courts' pronouncements.
Take the case of the Khairlanjil3 judgment in which the Ad Hoc Sessions Court
47. No 1 of 1894, India Code.
48. No 16 of 1927, India Code.
49. No 35 of 2009, India Code [RTEAct].
50. India Const, art 41.
51. No 57 of 2010, India Bill.
52. Anil Sadgopal, "Right to Education v. Right to Education Act" (2010) 38 Social Scientist 17.
53. Criminal Confirmation Case No 4/2008.
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in Bhandara District, Maharashtra, awarded the death penalty to six upper caste
men for the massacre of four Dalits (the 'untouchable' caste) of the Bhotmange
family in Khairlanji village on 29 September 2006. The verdict, delivered in
2008, was hailed as historic by the Dalit community, despite the fact that the
court reduced the event to just a grave crime and completely ignored the caste
character of it. When the case went to appeal to the Nagpur bench of the Bombay
High Court 2010, the death penalty was commuted. Dalits were disappointed,
but the caste question still did not come up. In the progressive legal imagination,
the Khairlanji decision represents speedy justice, and the fact that, culturally, it
marked an erasure of a history of deep-seated violence and caste prejudice did not
matter-that was the spectacular potential of the death penalty51
A recent illustration of spectacle politics is the government's response to
veteran Gandhian Anna Hazare's hunger strike. He demanded the constitution
of a joint committee comprising state and civil society members to finalize the
Jan Lokpal Bilf5 (a national ombudsman law for fighting corruption) before its
enactment. The fact that the Manmohan Singh government actually accepted all
the demands made by Hazare and his team is a spectacular move by the state to
promote itself as pro-people, human rights friendly, and committed to rooting
out corruption. In contrast, it is necessary to ask why the state has not responded
with equal urgency to Irom Sharmita's"6 more than decade-long fast demanding
the repeal of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958."v Does this
have anything to do with the strong nationalist narrative that was inherent to
Hazare's campaign, with regular refrains of "Jai Hind;" a huge flexi-banner reading
"Bharat Mata" (Mother India) adorning the stage at Delhi's Jantar Mantar where
he was fasting; and the patriotic waving of the tricolour after the government
conceded to all demands? Why have the many fasts by Medha Patkar not stopped
the Supreme Court from allowing the height of the Sardar Sarovar Dam to be
raised, even though this decision will result in more areas becoming submerged
54. S Anand, "Understanding the Khairlanji Verdict" The Hindu (5 October 2008), online:
<http://www.hindu.com/mag/2008/1 0I05/stories/2008100550090400.htm>; Anand
Teltumbde, The Persistence of Caste: The Khairlanji Murders and India's Hidden Apartheid
(New York: Zed Books, 2010).
55. No 39 of 2011, India Bill [AFSPA].
56. Irom Sharmila Chanu is a human rights defender from India's northeastern state of Manipur
where she has been on hunger strike for the past 12 years in protest against the AFSPA, which
gives the army extraordinary powers. For more on Irom Sharmila's protest, see Deepti Priya
Mehrotra, Burning Bright: from Sharmila and the Struggle for Peace in Manipur (New Delhi:
Penguin Books, 2009).
57. No 28 of 1958, India Code.
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and more people being displaced? The state's manoeuvre has created a spectacle
that has blinded us to the ways in which it selects the fasts that it wants to end.
58
For a final example, Manto's prophetic reading of the constitution's spectacle
returns as a rude awakening when we remember 1 July 2010, when Cherukuri
Rajkumar, also known as Comrade Azad, a spokesperson for a left-wing
extremist group, was killed extrajudicially by state forces. In January 2011, the
SC of India made a surprisingly sensitive assertion in response to a request for
a judicial probe into the killing: "We cannot allow the republic killing its own
children." The bench added: "We hope there will be an answer. There will be a
good and convincing answer."59 On 19 July 2010, around three weeks after his
killing, Outlook magazine" posthumously published Azad's last work, written
in response to an article by veteran journalist B.G. Verghese. In this piece, Azad
rejects Verghese's celebratory belief in India's constitutional democracy. Verghese
wrote: "The Maoists will fade away, democratic India and the Constitution will
prevail, despite the time it takes and the pain involved."6 In response Azad wrote:
In which part of India is the Constitution prevailing, Mr Verghese? In Dantewada,
Bijapur, Kanker, Narayanpur, Rajnandgaon? In Jharkhand, Orissa? In Lalgarh,
Jangalmahal? In the Kashmir Valley? Manipur? Where was your Constitution
hiding for 25 long years after thousand [sic] of Sikhs where massacred? When thou-
sands of Muslims were decimated? When lakhs of peasants are compelled to commit
suicides? When thousands of people are murdered by state-sponso'ed Salwa Judum
gangs? When adivasi women are gangraped? When people are simply abducted by
uniformed goons? Your Constitution is a piece of paper that does not even have the
value of toilet paper for the vast majority of the Indian people.62
In just one paragraph, Azad's words captured the essence of the sham that the
Constitution may be for most of India's poor and disenfranchised people. The
cruel reality of his words was reinforced when two weeks before Manto's 100th
birthday, the court dismissed the petition seeking a judicial probe into the killings.63
58. See generally Teresa Rehman, "Gaga over Anna, mute over Irom Sharmila," The Hoot (25
August 2011), online: <http://www.thehoot.org/web/home/story.php?storyid=5 4 68&pg= 1 &
mod= 1 &sectionld= 1 9&sectionname=ISSUES%201N%20MEDIA>.
59. J Venkatesan, "Our Republic must not kill its own children: Supreme Court" The Hindu (14
January 2011), online: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/nationalarticle 1092489.ece>.
60. Chemkuri Azad Rajkumar, "A Last Note to a Neo-Colonialist" Outlook (19 July 2010),
online: <http:l/wwwoutlookindia.com/article.aspx?266164>.
61. Chemkuri Azad Rajkumar, "A Last NoteTo A Neocolonist", Outlook (19 July 2010) online:
Outlook < http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266164>.
62. Ibid.
63. "Supreme Court Refuses Judicial Probe in Azad case" The Hindu (May 3, 2012), online:
<http:l/www.thehindu.comnews/states/andhra-pradesh/article3380 2 71 .ece>.
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After this order, the SC's bleeding-hearted concern about the death of the 'republic's
children' will forever be part of its spectacular history.
III. READING RIGHTS DIFFERENTLY
Rights emblematize the ghostly sovereignty of the unemancipated individual
in modernity. "
Liberalism's spectacle was best described by the young Karl Marx in his 1844 essay
"On the Jewish Question," where he complicated the notion of emancipation and
offered a critique of liberal rights that we can ignore today only at our own peril.6"
Marx questioned why the state should be regarded as the end of all emancipation
and suggested that political emancipation by the state is only a masquerade to
numb man's consciousness as a species. By distinguishing "political eman-
cipation' from "human emancipation," Marx pointed out that the rhetoric of
liberal rights ("the rights of man") that the secular state foregrounds is in effect
not human emancipation: "[M]an was not liberated from religion; he received
religious liberty. He was not liberated from property; he received the liberty to
own property. He was not liberated from the egoism of business; he received the
liberty to engage in business." 6
Wendy Brown, in a trenchant reading of "On the Jewish Question," writes:
[T]he ruse of power peculiar to liberal constitutionalism centers upon granting
freedom, equality and representation to abstract rather than concrete subjects.
The substitution of abstract political subjects for actual ones not only forfeits the
project of emancipation but resubjugates us precisely by emancipating substitutes
for us-by emancipating our abstracted representatives in the state and naming
this process "freedom." ... If... the bourgeois constitutional state is premised upon
depoliticized inegalitarian social powers, if it depends upon naturalizing ... abstract
representations of equality and community, then rights are the modern political
form that secure and legitimate these tenaencies.
67
The abstraction of the citizen-subject and the constitutionally guaranteed
rights afforded to the intricately manufactured image of the citizen-subject work
as a spectacle that blinds us from the violence of constitution making and the
64. Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995) at 110.
65. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Robert C Tucker, ed, 7he Marx-Engels Reader (New
York: WW Norton & Company, 1978) 24.
66. Ibid at 45.
67. Brown, supra note 64 at 106, 109-10.
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practices through which a Rechtsstaat polity is sustained by the state-market
collusion in a neo-liberal democracy. While the state creates the rights-bearing,
abstract citizen-subject, the market creates the abstract figure of the merit-driven,
rational, consuming, and entrepreneurial citizen-subject with individualized
desires and privatized ways to satiate those desires. To quote Brown again,
"Liberal equality guarantees that the state will regard us all as equally abstracted
from the social powers constituting our existence, equally decontextualized from
the unequal conditions of our lives."68
Clearly then, from a Marxist perspective, engaging the state as the only
arbiter of emancipation strengthens the state to make the playing field further
conducive for capitalism. French historian Fernand Braudel captures this
phenomenon sharply when he says, "Capitalism only triumphs when it becomes
identified with the state, when it is the state." 9 This is especially the case when
the responsibility to make and unmake abstract citizen-subjects is shared between
the state and the market, and when, on occasion, the market manufactures more
idealized forms of citizen-subjects-who are committed to individualized,
self-disciplined practices of desire and consumption-than the state.
Human emancipation, thus, can only be achieved when we question the
state as strongly as we question the market and when we pay acute attention to
the ways in which one feeds off the other. We cannot be blinded by what liberal
rights guarantee us, and we need to constantly question the paradigm of liberal
rights, which normalizes the rule of the market and makes the rule of law work
in synchronization with it-in effect normalizing inequalities. It is for this reason
that we need to read rights differently, to wrest them out of the captivity of rule
of law discourses. This task is upon us because of the spectacular potential that
the project of liberalism (and neo-liberalism, its more advanced avatar) possesses
to depoliticize the struggles of the rightsless-as has been the case both pre- and
postcolonialism.
As Nivedita Menon asks, "What are the implications for the liberatory
potential of rights once their meaning is fixed by law?"7 This question is especially
significant as most struggles for rights in liberal democracies are about gaining
fixed legal recognition for excluded communities. John and Jean Comaroff call
this focus on legal recognition a "fetishism of the law," where:
68. Ibid at 110.
69. Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) at 3
[emphasis added].
70. Recovering Subversion: Feminist Polictics Beyond the Law (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004) at 26.
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"[T]he law" ... is objectified, ascribed a life-force of its own, and attributed the
mythic capacity to configure a world of relations in its own image. ... It is a faith
owed largely to the fact that the promulgation of a new Legal Order, in the upper
case, signals a break with the past, with its embarrassments, its nightmares, its
torments, its traumas.
71
This break with the past is representative of the logic within which legal rights
operate, and the New Legal Order (NLO) is the spectacle that sustains this
logic-it is the flashpoint (the history-vanishing moment), or the spectacle that
announces our journey towards the Promised Land. This promise of a break with
the past masks the ways in which the NLO continues to unleash violence with
impunity; even if one is able to call the law's bluff, the NLO has amassed enough
surplus authority from the faith that people repose in it to sustain the spectacles
of emancipation that continue to make us fetishize the law and its seductive
promise of delivering us from all evil. The NLO works to sustain capitalism's
illusion of progress despite the acute disadvantage it breeds in the institutions of
governance and in the delivery of justice.
The Comaroffs point out the way in which the pervasiveness of neo-
liberalism across the world, especially in less industrialized countries of the global
south, has been accompanied by a pervasiveness of constitutionalism. They note
that faith in constitutionalism creates a "culture of legality" that infuses everyday
life almost everywhere, "even when both the spirit and the letter of the law are
despoiled, distended, desecrated; even as more regimes suspend it in the name of
emergency, expediency, exception; even as they expropriate its sovereignty unto
themselves; even as they franchise it OUt." 72
This phenomenon is most paradigmatically reflected in the way in which
the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government of India is celebrating its pro-Aam
Aadmi (common man) commitment by going into legislative overdrive-by
passing laws like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, 7 Right
to Information Act, 2005,71 Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act,
2005,7 1 Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009,76
71. John L Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, "Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance
and Sovereignty" in Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann & Julia
Eckert, eds, Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling: On the Governance of Law (Surrey: Ashgate,
2009) 31 at 32-33 [emphasis added].
72. Ibidat 33.
73. No 42 of 2005, India Code.
74. No 22 of 2005, India Code.
75. No 43 of 2005, India Code.
76. RTEAct, supra note 49.
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Scheduled Tribes And Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition Of Forest
Rights) Act, 2006,11 and, in the pipeline, the Jan Lokpal Bill. 'These legislative
projects stand in stark contrast to the government's ongoing commitment to
the project of divestments, the privatization of natural resources, the incarceration
of anyone who challenges the state's brutal policies, and the resort to violent
military means to achieve the ends of corporate capital's demands on the state.
The state's response of "hyperlegality"'78 is adequately buttressed by the demands
of citizenship claims made by civil society that lead "politics to migrate to the
court."79 Particularly in India, the Comaroffs describe Julia Eckert's observation
that "the 'use of the law' now 'complements or replaces' other species of counter-
politics."8 This state of hyperlegality is poignantly captured by the Comaroffs
when they say:
[C]lass struggles are giving way to class actions in which people are drawn together
by material predicament, culture, race, sexual preference, residence, faith and habits
of consumption become legal persons as their common complaints turn them into
plaintiffs with common identities. Citizens, subjects, governments, congregations,
chiefdoms, communities and corporations litigate against one another in an ever-
mutating kaleidoscope ... often at the intersections of tort law, human rights law,
constitutional law and criminal law. Even democracy has been judicialized: few
national elections these days go by without some resort to the courts.81
This phenomenon of rights-in-the-era-of-hyperlegality is about the emergence of
governance mechanisms that promote the withdrawal of the state-"the outsourcing
by government of many conventional operations, including those integral to the
management of 'bare life'" 82-and that simultaneously install regulatory governance
through legislation. Courts complement this trend by acting as legislators that mete
out rights by classifying population groups demanding legal recognition, much like
shopping malls providing customized responses to consumer feedback. This legalism
is promoted equally by the left, which regrettably has not been critical of the ways in
which hyperlegality can entrench and normalize disadvantage by institutionalizing it.
This is an interesting shift in the left's position. In the past, the left was
concerned more with methods of collective bargaining and other species of
counter-politics; it viewed the rights problem as important because of its
77. No 2 of 2007, India Code.
78. Nasser Hussain, "Hyperlegality" (2007) 10 New Criminal L Rev 514.
79. Comaroff& Comaroff, supra note 71 at 35.
80. Ibid, citing Julia Eckert, "From Subjects to Citizens: Legalism From Below and the
Homogenisation of the Legal Sphere" (2006) 53 J of Legal Pluralism 45 at 45.
81. Comaroff& Comaroff, supra note 71 at 35.
82. Ibid at 37.
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emphasis on freedom of contract and private property rights.83 Now, the left is
engaging in what Wendy Brown and Janet Halley call "left legalism, ' in which
the left "invoke[s] the liberal state's promise to make justice happen by means of
law."84 While these observations are particular to the situation in United States,
they are also applicable to the experiences of present day India.
The recent set of social justice statutes in India, some of which I mentioned
above, is a product of engagement with the law by very large, left-leaning,
people's movements. But what are the consequences of left legalism in an era
of the NLO and GEC? Does the stream of legislation reflect how human rights
friendly the state is, or does it operate as a spectacle that blinds us to the state's
militarized efforts to forcibly take away Adivasi land?85 How do those who engage
in left legalism gain faith in the rule of law that has historically been the tool for
their exclusion and annihilation, both during colonialism and later? What is the
left legalist's vision of emancipation? Are these statutes universally emancipatory,
or do they mask the violence inherent in their form and operation? Is the state
actually committed to the emancipation of its marginalized citizens? Or are these
statutes a means to make India look like an advanced democracy that has bravely
embraced the NLO and adapted well to the needs of GEC by foregrounding its
capacity to legislate on issues like "'good governance', 'rights' and 'development'
not so much with a solicitude for the nation-peoples as for the community of
foreign investors"?86 Is constitutionalism in India being "held hostage by movement
of global capital?"87
Wendy Brown characterizes this set of paradoxical questions well when she
asks, "When does legal recognition become an instrument of regulation, and political
recognition becomes [sic] an instrument of subordination?"88 In her analysis:
[h]istorically, rights emerged in modernity both as a vehicle of emancipation from
political disenfranchisement or institutional servitude and as a means of privileg-
83. Duncan Kennedy, "The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies" in Wendy Brown &
Janet Halley, eds, Left Legalism/Left Critique (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002) 178
[Brown & Halley, eds, Left Legalism].
84. Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, "Introduction" in Brown & Halley, eds, Left Legalism, ibid, I
at 7-8.
85. For the Indian state, corporate, and military nexus, particularly in the context of Adivasi land
acquisition for mining, see Arundhati Roy, Broken Republic: Three Essays (London: Penguin
Books, 2011).
86. Upendra Baxi, "Outline of a 'Theory of Practice' of Indian Constitutionalism" in Rajeev
Bhargava, ed, Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2008) 92 at 96.
87. Ibid.
88. Brown, supra note 64 at 99.
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ing an emerging bourgeoisie class within a discourse of formal egalitarianism and
universal citizenship. Thus, they emerged both as a means of protection against
arbitrary use and abuse of sovereign and social power and as a mode of securing
and naturalizing dominant social powers--class, gender and so forth. Not only did
bourgeoisie rights discourse mask by depoliticizing the social power of institutions
such as private property or the family, it organized mass populations for exploitation
and regulation .... 89
Rights, then, are a hydra-headed organism, and all rights-seeking enterprises-
especially those on the left-need to be careful when using the law to claim
them. While rights emerged as a means to limit sovereign power, once they are
enshrined within a constitutional document, their interpretation, implementation,
and desecration remain in the hands of the sovereign only. If we are captive in
our articulation of what rights we demand, especially under conditions where
our vocabulary is manufactured by the state, then what hope do we have for the
future of emancipation for subaltern struggles?
A potentially useful starting point for. responding to the paradox posed
by Brown is to probe how liberalism disciplines our histories and memories of
justice. How do we interrogate a political economy that promotes justice as a
commodity where its cost is dependent on the language in which you ask for
it and in the ways in which you publicly and privately 'perform' the rites
and rituals of disciplined citizenship? When every governmental articulation of
rights can become a spectacle for masking the tactic that is used to construct the
ideal rights-bearing subject, which kind of citizen, according to the sovereign,
qualifies for emancipation in the spheres of the family, polity, and market? And,
to return to Marx, what kind of counter-political engagement is required on
the part of people's struggles to create a politics of 'human emancipation' that
does not require the scaffolding of the legalistic limits of liberal rights? These are
pressing challenges to a justice system that is only be made available to those who
frame their requests in the language of rights approved by the state and who live
as citizens in ways that are approved by the state.
I find instructive the work of postcolonial historian Dipesh Chakrabarty in
this regard. In concluding this Part, I will make a brief reference to a theoretical
schema that Chakrabarty sets up in his book Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial
Thought and Historical Diffierence9 He offers a sophisticated analysis of Marx in
order to understand the life process of capital through two historical trajectories.
In one (History 1), capital's universal narrative deals with historical difference by
89. Ibid.
90. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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temporizing it and has the ability to subsume all progress under its logic. In the
other (History 2), the totalizing thrusts of capital constantly interrupt and make
room for the politics of human belonging and diversity."
Following in the steps of Chakrabarty, this article works through two
histories of emancipation in contemporary India. One of these (Emancipation
1) follows the liberal teleology of repression to emancipati6n of the rightsless-a
narrative that feeds into and reproduces the magic of modernity. In the other
(Emancipation 2), emancipation is inhabited and performed through bodily
habits and unselfconscious collective practices of the everyday and ordinary that
are not automatically aligned with the logic of capital. For sake of brevity, the
rest of this Part focuses more centrally on understanding Emancipation 1, and
the article concludes with some provisional glimpses into what Emancipation 2
might look like.
As I have already argued, one powerful tool for the propagation of Emancipation
1 is the legalistic language of human rights, which has become inescapably desirable,
despite a critical consciousness about the cruelly liberal history of its idea and
practice. For us, human rights remain, to use Gayatri Spivak's expression, "what
one cannot not want. '92 Wherever one might be placed on the ideological map
of the left, even the idea of revolution, inscribed within the political and
social practices of liberalism, cannot escape using the vocabulary of rights. 3 This
consciousness has constituted each of us as 'desiring' nationalist, heterosexual,
able-bodied, and entrepreneurial subjects to whom liberalism offers means like
the market, secularism, merit, multiculturalism, and, of course, human rights
law, as remedies for inequality, subordination, and exclusion.
What has also become apparent is that the most legitimate currency of
negotiation for social and people's movements today is the language of liberal
human rights as a means of righting wrongs, rather than solving or contesting
oppressive paradigms.9" As a result of this, states respond to issues of rights
violations, through the practice of Emancipation 1, by promulgating a plethora
of 'new' human rights-in effect characterizing human rights enunciations as
the telos of justice-seeking projects. While this results in more law, it also
91. Iidat 47.
92. Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993) at 46.
93. See generally Oishik Sircar, "Sexing Spaces of Emancipation: The Politics and Poetics
of Sexuality within the World Social Forum Process" (New Delhi: CACIM, 2010),
online: <http://cacim.net/twiki/tiki-pagehistory.php?page=Publications%2FOishik/20
Sircar&diff2= 3&diff style=sideview>.
94. Wendy Brown, "Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights" [Brown, "Suffering"] in Brown & Halley,
eds, Left Legalism, supra note 83, 420 at 422.
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co-opts claimants into nation-building projects and into a political economy
that promotes justice as a consumptive product. It is within the market that
the horizon of justice is established today. To ask for justice or recognition has
become, thus, a particular manner of being in the world: It not only confines us
into a particular language, it also forces us to perform our claims in a particular
way, that is, as the good, nationalist, heterosexual, respectable, able-bodied, and
entrepreneurial citizen.
So what would a politics of Emancipation 2 look like? For that, can we
engage the law without falling into the trap of liberalism? Can we afford to
completely disengage with liberal rights? At what cost do we move beyond the
legalese of human rights? Does speaking the liberal language operate as a strategy
for people's movements, or is it a co-optation "of it? What does the left's turn to
legalism hold for the future of Emancipation 2? And as Wendy Brown enquires,
"[H]ow might the paradoxical elements of the struggle for rights in an emancipatory
context articulate a field of justice beyond 'that which we cannot not want'?"95
IV. DYNAMICS OF DISENCHANTMENT
According to the fable of their constitution, Indians today are all 'itizens.
Chakrabarty's provocation is troubling at this point in history when we are still
buoyant about the recent sixty-year milestone of the Constitution of India. On
national television we were comfortably consuming Gulzar's97 mellifluous rendition
of why each citizen needs to defend the Samvidhan (Constitution) on one hand,
and the prime time coverage of the state's manufactured constitutional legitimacy
for an armed offensive against the "Maoists" on the other. This despite the fact
that the SC has categorically disapproved the arming of the Salwa Judum, an
illegal, state-sponsored paramilitary group in the state of Chattisgargh, 98 and
has snubbed the government for raising the bogey of Naxaism 99 against human
95. Ibid at 432.
96. Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian'
Pasts?" (1992) 37 Representations 1 at 8.
97. Gulzar is an award-winning Urdu poet and a songwriter for several critically acclaimed Hindi
films.
98. J Venkatesan, "Supreme Court Disapproves of Arming Salwa Judum" The Hindu (1 April
2008), online: <http://hindu.com/2OO8/04/01/stories/2008040161000100.htm>.
99. Naxalism is a militant ideology that emerged out of the 1967 peasant uprising for land
redistribution from the Naxalbari district in the state of West Bengal, India. Naxal
movements are still active where struggles against land acquisition by the Indian state
exist. Naxalites are interchangeably also called Maosists because they organize under the
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rights activists.""5 While India's corporate actors were proudly declaring how the
Indian economy braved the recession, they were also condoning the incarceration
of Doctor Binayak Sen"'0 because his politics would have undermined the credibility
of the mining industry's promises of foreign direct investment into India.
The poetics of constitutional magic, the politics of constitutional markets,
and the polemics of constitutional coercion make us believe in the fable of
citizenship. The power of this fable also disciplines us to almost unquestioningly
accept anything that carries the tag of constitutional legitimacy attached to
it, such as special security legislation, disinvestment policies, large industrial
projects that lead to mass scale displacement, rights articulated in the language of
privacy, and, of course, the twenty-one-month long Emergency that was declared
in India between 1975 and 1977.
The "dynamics of disenchantment"' 102 are partially allayed by the trust that
the rightsless have placed in the Constitution because of the creative activist
interventions by the SC over the last several years in the form of Public Interest
Litigation (PIL) or Social Action Litigation (SAL) to protect and uphold the
human rights of a range of disadvantaged communities and individuals. The
diamond jubilee of the Constitution thus cannot be celebrated without
acknowledging the thirty years of "judicial populism""3 in India spearheaded by
the SC. As Justice Dwivedi observed in Kesavananda Bharathi v State of Kerala:
The Constitution [of India] is not intended to be the arena of legal quibbling for
men with long purses. It is made for the common people. It should generally be so
construed as that they can understand and appreciate it. The more they understand
it the more they love it and the more they prize it.
0
4
Communist Party of India (Maoist). For a historical account, see Sumanta Banerjee, India's
Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising (Zed Books: London, 1984).
100. Press Trust of India "Supreme Court Snubs Govt. for Raising Naxal Bogey Against Rights
Activists" The Hindu (22 February 2010), online: <http://beta.thehindu.com/news/nationall
article 11151 1.ece> [PTI].
101. Binayak Sen is a medical doctor, human rights activist, and member of the People's Union
for Civil Liberties. He has been involved with public health work in remote areas in the
state of Chattisgargh for several years, and has been critical of the government's policies
on land acquisition and eviction of poor peasants. In May 2007, he was allegedly falsely
arrested by the police on charges of sedition and for being an alleged Naxalite. After several
failed attempts, the SC of India finally granted him bail in March 2011. A final decision on
his conviction is pending (as of 2012). See generally Minnie Vaid, A Doctor to Defend: The
Binayak Sen Story (Delhi: Rajpal & Sons, 2011).
102. Upendra Baxi, "Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of
India" (1985) Third World Legal Studies 107 at 107.
103. Ibid.
104. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and Ors v State of Kerala andAnr, [1973] AIR 1461 at
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If the legitimacy of the 'Constitution has remained intact for sixty years, this
fact is almost singularly owed to the SC's efforts (in response to claims by people's
movements and social action groups) through half its life span. As Baxi noted
in 1985, "The Supreme Court ofIndia is at long last becoming ... the Supreme
Court for Indians.""1 5 Baxi's optimism, however, has waned over time, and he
wrote in 2002:
This disenchantment is now more fully voiced when the still rightless peoples ...
have to say even to the Supreme Court of India: 'Physician heal thyself'. The new
zamindari [landlordism] of public interest by courts appears to them no different
from its earlier forms and incarcerations, although it provides a career path for many
an entrepreneur in the market for human rights activism.
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The impetus for the "charismatic inaugural moment"1"7 of judicial populism
was the Emergency, during which the SC's role in protecting Constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental rights was itself suspect. In the landmark 1976 case
of Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v Shivakant Shukla,00 individuals
detained without trial challenged the constitutionality of a presidential order
suspending the right to challenge detention orders for the duration of the
Emergency. They argued that the presidential order and their detentions vio-
lated Article 21's guarantee that "[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."0 9 The SC
denied the petitions and upheld the presidential order, opining that "in times
of emergency the Executive safeguards the life of the nation" and that during such
times its actions cannot be challenged as arbitrary or unlawful."' As Ashok H.
Desai and S. Muralidhar note:
[The case] granted virtual immunity to any action of the executive affecting the life
and liberty of the citizen. ... The judgment brought into question the role of the
Supreme Court as the guardian of citizens' liberties. The vigorous growth of PIL was
in some measure a reaction to this criticism.11
para 2013 [Kesavananda].
105. Baxi, supra note 102 [emphasis added].
106. Upendra Baxi, "Preface" in SP Sathe, JudicialActivism in India: Transgressing Border and
Enforcing Limits, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) i at xvi-xvii [emphasis in
original] [Sathe].
107. Ibid.
108. Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v SS Shukla, [1976] SCR 172 (India) [ADM
Jabalpur].
109. India Const, supra note 5.
110. ADM Jabalpur, supra note 108 at p 219.
111. "Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems" in BN Kirpal et al, eds, Supreme But
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Justice H.R. Khanna dissented, arguing that "detention without trial is an anathema
to all those who love personal liberty.""' 2 Justice Khanna's observation in the
Kesavananda judgment about why the Constitution needs amendments to ensure
that the right to life cannot be suspended under any circumstance was a brave act
of dissent in the spirit of the Constitution's revolutionary past:
No generation has a monopoly of wisdom nor has a right to place fetters on future
generations to mould the machinery of Governments. If no provisions were made
for amendment of the Constitution, the people would have recourse to extra-
constitutional method like revolution to change the Constitution. 
113
Today, recourse to extra-constitutional .means to change the Constitution is active,
as evidenced by the militant turn that several peasant movements have taken in
the country over the past few years. The sovereign in India still holds absolute
authority to declare a state of emergency."'
The New York Times published an editorial two days after the ADMJabalpur
dissent as a tribute to Justice Khanna, stating:
If India ever finds its way back to the freedom and democracy that were proud
hallmarks of its first 18 years as an independent nation, someone will surely erect a
monument to Justice H. R. Khanna of the Supreme Court.
It was Justice Khanna who spoke out fearlessly and eloquently for freedom this week
in dissenting from the court's decision upholding the right of Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's government to imprison political opponents at will and without court
hearings ... the Indian Supreme Court's decision appears close to utter surrender.
115
Although India has seemingly found its way back to freedom and democracy,
the SC remains subject to the will of the sovereign and extracts public reverence
through spectacles. In its post-Emergency decision in Maneka Gandhi v Union
of India,"1 ' the SC affirmed that the doctrine of due process cannot be divorced
Not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2004) 159 at 161.
112. ADMJabalpur, supra note 108 at 264.
113. Kesavananda, supra note 104 at para 1445.
114. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, translated by Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2005).
115. Dhananjay Mahapatra, "Dissenter Judge During Emergency Forgotten" 7he Times of
India (3 March 2008), online: <http:l/articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-03-03/
india/27760185_l-fundamental-rights-constitution-judgment>, citing "Fading Hope in
India" New York Times (30 April 1976) A26.
116. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621 (India) [Maneka].
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from the operation of the fundamental rights to equality, freedom, life, and
liberty,117 in effect expanding the SC's power to strike down legislation and to
include the inspection of a statute's commitment to substantive due process.'1
Further, pursuant to Justice Khanna's dissent in Kesavananda, the forty-fourth
amendment to the Constitution was passed, excluding Articles 21 and 22 from
suspension during times of emergency.119 In 2009, former Chief Justice of India
M.N. Venkatachalliah said at a public lecture that the majority decision in ADM
Jabalpur should be consigned to the "dustbin of history."2 ' So much so that in
January 2011, a bench of Justices Aftab Alam and A.K. Ganguly said that the
ADMJabalpur decision was "erroneous." 2'
Yet, even after a spectacular history of judicial activism, PIL, and SAL in
India, the SC has time and again upheld the constitutionality of notorious special
security statutes like the Terrorist Activities and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1987,122 the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002,123 and the Armed Forces
Special Powers Act, 2' and has found no substantive due process anomaly with
these laws. 2 ' None of the precedents mentioned above stopped former SC judge
Arijit Pasayat from publicly stating in 2009 that terrorists are animals and thus
not deserving of human rights-in effect lending legitimacy to the extrajudicial
killings and torture that are carried out with legal impunity in the name of
protecting national security.'26 Similarly, the celebratory spectacle of Article 21
and its creative interpretations stopped us from rigorously critiquing Article 22,
117. India Const, arts 14, 19, 21.
118. Desai & Muralidhar, supra note 111 at 160.
119. The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, online: <http://indiacode.nic.in/
coiweb/amend/amend44.htm>.
120. Press Trust of India "SC: Emergency-era order violated rights" The Asian Age (3 January
2011), online: <http://www.asianage.com/indialsc-emergency-era-order-violated-rights-496>.
121. Ramdeo Chauhan at Rajnath Chauhan vs Bani Kant Das 6- Ors, No 1378 of 2009 (review
petition), online: <http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1656850/>.
122. No 28 of 1987, India Code.
123. No 15 of 2002, India Code.
124. No 28 of 1958, India Code.
125. These three laws have been declared constitutional by the SC-despite widely recorded
evidence of how they have unleashed and legitimized police and army brutality, particularly
against 'suspect' populations-in the following three cases: Kartar Singh v State of Punjab,
[19941 3 SCC 569 (India); People's Union for Civil Liberties &Anr v Union of India, [2004]
AIR 456; Naga People's Movement, of Human Rights v Union of India, [ 1998] AIR 431.
126. Kranti Kumara & Keith Jones, "India: Supreme Court judge advocates 'animal rights' for
alleged terrorists" World Socialist Web Site (20 February 2009), online:
<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/feb2OO9/indi-f20.shtml>.
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which legitimizes "preventive detention based on jurisdiction of suspicion ... as
a just order of exception to the precious fundamental rights to life and liberty."' 27
What, then, has allowed the highest court to maintain its avowed position
as the "Supreme Court for Indians" 128 after having compromised on the "basic
structure" 129 element of fundamental rights that was ceremoniously asserted as
non-derogable through any legislative measure or amendments to the Constitu-
tion itself in celebrated cases like IC Golaknath v State ofPunjab,35 Kesavananda,3 '
and Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India?'3 2 In other words, what has sustained
our faith in the SC as the ultimate arbiter of fairness and justice when many of
its own judgments have grossly compromised basic guarantees of constitutional
fundamental rights? What role has an activist judiciary played in representing the
Samvidhan to the common people to make them "love it" and "prize it"?'33
The sixty-third year of the Constitution ofIndia provides an opportune
moment to reflect on what sustains our faith in this document and the institutions
that interpret it. The ambitious nature of this reflection demands both time and
space that are unavailable for this article. However, I will focus on some
critical events in courts' interpretations and applications of the Constitution, paying
specific attention to the question of socio-economic rights, primarily between
2000-2010. The inquiry is prompted by a need to find out how the Indian
economy's liberalization in 1991 impacted the way the courts responded to rights
questions. Did they build on the trail-blazing history of judicial activism from
the 1980s, or did they give in to the corporatized demands of the NLO to keep
pace with the march of global capitalism? In other words, how do we under-
stand the trajectory of Emancipation 1 in the history of post-liberalization Indian
judicial-constitutionalism?
One trend suggests that in deciding PIL cases where the litigant is seeking
redress for socio-economic rights violations judges have become "reluctant
127. Baxi, supra note 15 at 37.
128. Baxi, supra note 102.
129. The "basic structure" doctrine is a judicial safeguard against amendments to certain portions
of the Constitution ofIndia by the legislature that form its basic structure, like the chapter
on fundamental rights. For the debates on this, see Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Democracy and
Constitutionalism in India: A Study of the Basic Structure Doctrine (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
130. [1967] AIR 1643.
131. Kesavananda, supra note 104.
132. [1980] AIR 1789.
133. Kesavananda, supra note 104.
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to strongly penalize the government even when the state fail[s] to fulfill its
statutory obligations. Instead, courts adopt ... weak remedies, such as setting
up committees and [commissions] "13" This emphasis on weak remedies marks
a peculiar characteristic of legislative democracies like India, where most socio-
economic rights are enumerated in the Constitution but are never on par with
civil and political rights. This status makes socio-economic rights non-justiciable
and only progressively realizable. Given their constitutionally vulnerable status,
socio-economic rights are further at a "systemic risk in legislative democracies
because those who would benefit from them lack political power."135 In effect,
while we might have rights-enhancing judgments from courts that interpret the
Constitution expansively, these judgments'do not transform structures of
injustice-rather, they often normalize these structures.
A plain reading of the Constitution sets up the spectacular potential of its
design. Here I do not refer to the "expanding horizons of Article 21"' 3 that have
enabled the SC to use the article creatively to read several rights into the Constitution,
but rather to the commonsensical distinction between Fundamental Rights (FRs)
and Directive Principles of State Policy (DPs). As is evident from the language
used, there is a clear hierarchy between these two sets of entitlements. FRs like
equality (Article 14) and life (Article 21) are worded in a way that imposes a positive
limitation on state action, namely that "the state shall not deny to any person
..." or "no person shall be deprived." On the other hand, the DPs such as work
(Articles 41 to 43), education (Article 45), health (Article 47), and environment
(Article 48A) are preceded by aspirational language-"the state shall promote
with special care ... "; "the state shall take steps by suitable legislation ... "; "the
state shall ... make effective provision for ... "; "the state shall, within the limits
of its economic capacity and development ..."; or "the state shall endeavor to
secure ... ". The distinction between the two, then, is a matter of the intention
with which they were inserted in the Constitution in the first place.
Regarding the DPs, B.R. Ambedkar noted during the Constituent Assembly
Debates that it was
the intention of the Assembly that in future both legislature and the executive
should not merely pay lip-service to these principles enacted in this part but that
134. Shylashri Shankar & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Courts and Socioeconomic Rights in India" in
Varun Gauri & Daniel M Brinks, eds, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social
and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2008) 146 at 147 [emphasis added].
135. Ibid.
136. For a discussion on the "expanding horizons of Article 21," see Mahendra P Singh, VN
Shukla's Constitution of India, 9th ed (Lucknow: Eastern Book, 1994) at 176.
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they should be made the basis of all executive and legislative action that may be
taken thereafter in the matter of governance of the country.1
37
Yet, the DPs were, from the beginning, imagined as entitlements that would be
progressively realized, contingent upon the economic ability of the state. While
the state under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru always put rights enshrined in
the DPs on the backburner by hiding behind the fig leaf of economic incapacity,
it continued to pump money to arm the state-to the extent of investing enough
monetary resources to orchestrate the Emergency. Progressive realization, it was
discovered after the scandal of the Emergency, was a myth. As already mentioned,
it was with the intention of undoing the damage of decisions like ADMJabalpur
that the SC engaged in judicial populism and started interpreting a range of 'new'
human rights into the framework of FRs. This liberalization of constitutional
interpretation was also accompanied by the relaxation of the rule of locus standi,
giving rise to the marvel called PIL/SAL. As Baxi notes, this marked the moment
when the SC started "taking suffering seriously."'38 Unfortunately, the SC could
not sustain the seriousness for very long.
As Radha D'Souza notes, during the first phase of the PIL/SAL years (1977-
1987) the SC "emphasized human rights and facilitated access to justice for
marginalized classes and groups."'139 In the second phase (1988-1998) it started
engaging with PIL primarily on issues of governance.4 0 And during the third
phase, which began in 1998,
the [SC's] responses to economic legislation in the wake of neo-liberal reforms, which
include privatization, liberalization, withdrawal of the state from critical areas of
decision making, and increased federal intervention in the states among other things
... raised concerns about the ramifications of PIL in the era of globalization.
14 1
Since the beginning of this phase, "the [SC] has upheld liberalization and priva-
tization but declined to intervene in matters of redistributive justice."' 2 In doing
so, the SC fashioned itself as an organ of neo-liberal governance, and according
to Balakrishnan Rajagopal started "sharing the biases of many of the goals and
methods of [neo-liberal] governance itself... [like] market fundamentalism, state
fetishism, and the culture-ideology of consumerism."'143
137. Shankar & Mehta, supra note 134 at 148.
138. Baxi, supra note 102 at 107.
139. Radha D'Souza, "The TIhird World' and Socio-Legal Studies: Neo-Liberalism and Lessons
from India's Legal Innovations" (2005) 4 Soc & Leg Stud 487 at 488.
140. Sathe, supra note 106 at 18; ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid at 506.
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This turn has been substantiated through an empirical study by Varun
Gauri, which shows that between 1961 and 2008, the SC's response to socio-
economic rights questions increasingly became pro-middle class and anti-poor.
Among other things, success rates for disadvantaged social classes in selected FRs
cases before the SC decreased drastically from 71.4 per cent (1961-1989) to 47.2
per cent (2000-2008). Conversely, the success rates for claimants from advantaged
social classes increased from 57.9 per cent (1961-1989) to 73.3 per cent (2000-
2008).4 As he notes in his conclusion:
The data here constitute a prima facie validation of the concern that judicial atti-
tudes are less favorably inclined to the claims of the poor than they used to be, either
as the exclusive result of new judicial interpretations or, more likely, in conjunction
with changes in the political and legislative climate.145
Clearly, the 'break with the past' occurred in the period following the flashpoint
year of 1991.
In another survey of the SC's docket, Nick Robinson "finds a court over-
whelmed by petitions not from poor or ordinary people but from those with
money and resources. In fact, these more privileged litigants very often swamp
the court using the very mechanisms that were historically justified to make it
more accessible to the less fortunate."1 41 In 2007, 40 per cent of the SC's
regular hearings were on tax, arbitration, and service issues: "A disproportionate
number of appeals are made up of these cases, which generally involve the more
affluent litigants or government lawyers (who do not bear the cost of the appeal
themselves).."' 4 Robinson's findings show that in the 1970s, around 10 per cent
of the cases before the SC were fundamental rights writ petitions, of which 5 per
cent were admitted, and in 2008, the numbers dropped drastically to 2 per cent,
of which none were admitted:
In 2008, the court received 24,666 letters, postcards, or petitions asking its inter-
vention in cases that might be considered public interest litigation. Of these, just
226 were even placed before judges on admission days, and only a small fraction of
these were heard as regular hearing matters. The rest were rejected."4 8
Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement Perspective" (2007) 8 Human Rights
Review 157 at 180.
144. Varun Gauri, Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? (Working
Paper No 5109) (Washington: The World Bank, 2009) at 16.
145. Ibid at 13.
146. Nick Robinson, "Hard to reach" Frontline 27:3 (12 February 2010), online: <http://www.
hindu.com/thehindu/fline/fl2703/stories/20100212270304600.htm>.
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This drop might have had a lot to do with an articulated stand by successive
governments and many political parties that have frowned upon judicial activism
allegedly usurping turf of the executive." 9 The present UPA government has even
proposed a national litigation policy to claim damages from those who file frivolous
PlLs. This move comes at a time when it is well known that it is neither poor
communities nor the human rights activists who file PIL/SAL on their behalf but
rather the state that is the most active litigant.' The troubling concern here is
that PIL/SAL has turned into the proverbial Frankenstein that the state is unable
to control- which is why the state needs to discredit it forcibly. This is bad news
for the rightsless, for whom PIL/SAL seemed to be the most powerful means of
gaining at least recognition and visibility, if not emancipation and justice.
Through what he calls the "conditional social rights" approach, Madhav
Khosla's reading of the way in which the SC has approached questions
of socio-economic rights might help us understand this situation better. As he
notes, "Rather than focusing on the inherent nature of measures undertaken by
the state, the conditional social rights approach focuses on their implementa-
tion. No judicial review is conducted on the former question, making the rights
conditional upon state action."'' He also observes that the conditionality emerges
from the fact that many SC judgments have named 'new' rights but have not
elaborated on their content.' 2 Thus, the articulated right becomes a hollow spec-
tacle: You can celebrate its naming, but will eventually mourn its non-realization.
This reinforces to my earlier point that petitioning the SC to respond to,
correct, undo, or remedy violations of FRs holds little meaning for the rightsless
because the judgment will remain a mere spectacle, and the realization of the
right-even when it is upheld by the court-is conditional on political will.
Furthermore, the political will to implement a judgment on social rights is
149. Seetha, "Turf Tussle - 'Judicial pronouncements have ranged from the divine to the comical"'
The Telegraph (24 December 2006), online: <http://www.telegraphindia.com/1061224/
asp/insight/story_7168959.asp#>; TNN, "Judiciary Shouldn't Undermine Executive PM"
The Times of India (7 February 2011), online: <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/2011-02-07/india/28377720_1_judiciary-justice-kapadia-democracy>.
150. Anindo Dey, "Government the Biggest Litigant in the State" The Times ofIndia (10
February 2009), online: <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-02-10/
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contingent upon the state's ostensible economic capacity. The faith in the spec-
tacle of PIL and the resultant fate of resorting to constitutional remedies are thus
deeply restricted by a double conditionality.
Although compelling, the conditionality argument must be used cautiously.
This approach can absolve the courts of their complicity in crafting a jurispru-
dence of GEC, which in actuality has been the situation where "the constituency
on whose behalf the enhancement of judicial power has been strengthened
[through PIL/SAL jurisprudence] began to emerge as the casualty of the exercise
of that power.""1 3 In two scathing articles in the Economic and Political Weekly
written in 2004 and 2009, senior SC lawyer Prashant Bhushan traces a set of
SC judgments on issues ranging from national security to development that
have gravely undermined the FRs tenets of the Constitution.15' Many of these
judgments can be characterized as "pro-human rights but anti-poor,""' further
enabling the spectacle of Emancipation 1 to thrive. These judgments represent a
narrative that endorses the idea that conditions of capitalism will better human
rights guarantees. ,
As Bhushan angrily notes:
Since the liberalisation of the Indian economy, even the [SC's] rhetoric on socio-
economic rights have [sic] been weakening. Very often the court has itself ordered the
violation of those rights ... [This] seriously calls into question the commitment of the
Indian courts to the rights of the poor and to the constitutional imperative of creating
an egalitarian socialist republic. ... Part of the reason for this, undoubtedly, lies in the
class structure of the Indian judiciary. The higher judiciary in India almost invariably
comes from the elite section of the society and has become a self-appointing and self-
perpetuating oligarchy. ... [T]here is no accountability of the higher judiciary ... Even
public criticism of judges has often been held to be contempt of court. 156
Bhushan's observations are reiterated by Baxi in his reading of the SC's post-
liberalization turn. In what he calls the "structural adjustment of judicial
activism,"157 Baxi provides five paradigmatic illustrations of what this turn means.
153. Ramanathan, supra note 45.
154. Prashant Bhushan, "Supreme Court and PIL: Changing Perspectives Under Liberalisation"
Economic and Political Weekly 39:18 (1 May 2004) 1770 [Bhushan, "Supreme Court"];
Prashant Bhushan, "Misplaced Priorities and Class Bias of the Judiciary" Economic and
Political Weekly 44:14 (4 April 2009) 32 [Bhushan "Misplaced Priorities"].
155. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, "Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the
Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement Perspective" (2007) 8 Human Rights
Review 157 at 157.
156. Bhushan, "Misplaced Priorities," supra note 154 at 37.
157. Upendra Baxi, "Structural Adjustment of Judicial Activism" (Inaugural Lecture delivered at
West Bengal Academy of Juridical Sciences, 10 June 2006), [unpublished].
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First, he points to the way in which the SC gave short shrift to a petition
that claimed that India's accession to the World Trade Organization violated both
FRs and the basic structure doctrine."5 8 Baxi notes that the SC "asked the peti-
tioners to return to its powers as and when any such deleterious impact [violation
of FRs] became more manifest!"'1 9 His second example is the infamous 1989
Bhopal settlement (which may have started the trend Bhushan refers to), in
which the SC not only reduced the compensation amount from 3 billion US
dollars to 470 million US dollars in full and final settlement, but also provided
Union Carbide Corporation full immunity from criminal proceedings. 60 As
Baxi writes, "The settlement orders mark[ed] the beginnings of a judicially
induced/managed Indian transition from the paradigm of the universal human
rights of all suffering peoples to that of trade-related, market-friendly human
rights paradigm."'' 1 Baxi's third illustration refers to the dilution of labour
rights by the SC. He points in particular to a 2006 case in which a judge goes as
far as to "suggest that his predecessors labored under the misimpression that ours
was a socialist constitution!"'62 Fourth, he comments on the SC's "meandering
jurisprudence" on the Narmada case:
At one decisional moment, we are told that the height of the dam may not be raised
without the utmost solicitous regard for the human rights, and human futures, of
the ousted project affected peoples. At another decisional moment stands enacted
the mysterious paripassu principle under whose auspices, submergence may actually
occur with some indeterminate regard for relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement. At
a third moment, the affected peoples stand somehow assured of that the Court is
not powerless to render justice to the adversely affected peoples even as submergence
occurs. Who knows what a fourth moment may after all turn out to be?'63
The fourth moment Baxi refers to in this passage is the SC's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' petition and its order allowing the height of the dam to be increased.
Since then, the door to the SC for the Narmada Bachao Andolan (the plaintiffs)
158. Ibid at 23.
159. Shiva KantJha v Union ofIndia, WP (C) No 1357 (2007). For the text of the initial
petition files in the Delhi High Court, see online: <http://www.shivakantjha.org/openfile.
php?filename=pil/writ petition_226.htm>. See also Yogesh Tyagi, "The Denunciation of
Human Rights" (2008) 79 The British Yearbook of International Law 86 at 95.
160. Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India and Others, etc, 1989 SCALE (1) 380 (India).
161. Supra note 106 at 24.
162. Ibid at 25 [emphasis in original].
163. Ibid
562 (2012149 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
has been closed. And this instance also provides a lesson for social movements
blinded by the spectacle of PIL/SAL: Rather than thinking of the SC as the court
of first option in cases of FRs violations, it should be considered a last resort.
For his fifth illustration, Baxi points to the SC's approval of urban demolition
drives "that cruelly [impose themselves] on the bloodied bodies of the urban
impoverished."16 He references, among other cases, the deeply prejudiced Almitra
Pate/judgment discussed by Bhushan.
Needless to say, both Bhushan's and Baxi's choice and critique of cases are
selective. However, they establish those critical events that paradigmatically
mark the SC's embrace of the NLO. Both authors try to illustrate how the SC is
constantly pitting the rights of the powerless against the rights of the powerful,
ultimately favouring the latter even as it uses the language of rights itself. As Usha
Ramanathan comments on the SCs confrontation with conflicting interests:
The right of over 30 per cent of residents of Delhi to their shelter in the slum settle-
ments was pitted against the need to 'clean up' the city. The right to a relatively
unpolluted environment by means of the relocation of industries was pitted against
the right of the working classes to their livelihood. The right to life, livelihood and
protection from immiseration and exploitation of communities displaced along the
Narmada was pitted against the right to water that the dam was expected to reach to
the people in parts of Gujarat; it was also pitted against the enormous amounts of
money that had already been expended on the dam. Even the right of the victims of
the Bhopal gas disaster to receive compensation was pitted against the bureaucratic
imperative of winding up the processing of claims. 16
Outside of the judicial realm, since the 1990s, state policies on social justice have
also been designed in such a way that they portray the state as human rights-friendly.
However, this image crumbles when the human rights of the powerless come into
conflict with the corporatized and militarized agendas of the state. A trend that
has accompanied this process is the individuation of the rights question, whereby
the state speaks of rights issues in the individual-and no longer in the collec-
tive-sense. If the collective question of entitlement comes up for consideration,
it is addressed not as a rights issue that will attract state accountability but rather
as an issue of service delivery, which can also be outsourced to non-state actors.
Classic examples are the rights to food, education, and health, among others-all
of which are being litigated, but only to put in place service delivery mechanisms
and not necessarily to make structural transformations to institutions of
subjugation. The dynamics of disenchantment seem more alive than ever before.
164. Ibid.
165. Ramanathan, supra note 45.
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V. PRIVATIZING EMANCIPATION
Publicity is the very soul ofjustice 166
Reading beyond Bhushan and Baxi's lament, one might refer to the 2009
Naz Foundation'6 7 judgment of the Delhi High Court (HC) as an example
of the progressive impact liberalization has had on judicial imagination. The
decriminalization of same-sex relationships is clearly an outcome of the gradually
increasing cultural acceptance of diverse sexualities that has taken place as a result
of liberalization and globalization, as is evident from the court's constant allusions
to international human rights law and case law, and precedents primarily from
the United States. These references made apparent the cultural logic behind
the court's judgment: India needs to live up to the progressive developments in
other parts of the (Western) world by decriminalizing sodomy. As Anjali Gopalan,
founder of petitioner Naz Foundation, said after the judgment was delivered,
"Oh my God, we've finally stepped into the 2P' century.""16 This exclamatory
declaration seems to be a history-vanishing moment, where the ostensibly pro-
gressive present contributes to queer emancipaTion at the cost of blinding us to a
historicized understanding of the cruelly liberal genealogies of present-day India.
While on the face of it this might be a convincing perspective, it must be
noted that the Naz Foundation judgment is built upon on the foundations of the
liberal virtue of privacy. Above, in Part II of this article, I argued that the idea
of emancipation in the NLO has been privatized and that the Naz Foundation
case is a classic example of this phenomenon. While at first look the judgment
is progressive, and indeed historic, it seeks to recognize only the rights of
those homosexual men who have the privilege of access to private space. The
primacy put on private sex is clearly an elitist qualifier to read down the law
because it excludes from its purview a whole range of non-elite and Indigenous
sexually marginalized people who do not enjoy the privilege of private space. 69
The privacy standard is a myth because those who have access to private space
were already outside the reach of the law. As Ashley Tellis asks, "What is the
point of allowing consensual sex between private adults of the same sex when
most violations are of us in the public realm: in institutions, on the streets, in
166. John Bowring, The Works ofJeremy Bentham, vol IV (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843) at 316.
167. Naz Foundation, supra note 27.
168. Elizabeth Flock, "The Law Breaker", Forbes India (26 December 2009),
online: <http://business.in.com/printcontent/8082>.
169. Oishik Sircar, "Questions of Visibility" (2008) Plainspeak 10.
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parks, toilets and wherever else?""'0 Jason Fernandes has noted that the judgment
prioritizes the interests of urban, English-speaking, middle-class leaders of the
queer rights movement in India by overshadowing those very sexually marginal-
ized (Hijras, Kothis, Panthis)7 ' who they claim to represent.172 My argument is
not a dismissal of the judgment or the fact that it will truly empower the queer
community, but rather that the trope of privacy is a contentious one that can
be more damaging than helpful. Privacy arguments also have the tendency to
promote privatized forms of governance among sexually marginalized citizens
through practices of individuation.
As Wendy Brown notes in the American context of decriminalization of sodomy
on the grounds of privacy:
Privacy, for example, is for many feminists a site that depoliticizes many of the
constituent activities and injuries of women: reproduction, domestic assault, incest,
unremunerated household labour, and compulsory emotional and sexual service to
men. Yet for those concerned with sexual freedom, with welfare rights for the poor,
and with the rights to bodily integrity historically denied racially subjugated peo-
ples, privacy generally appears unambiguously valuable. ... Like rights themselves,
depending on the function of privacy in the powers that make the subject, and de-
pending on the particular dimension of marked identity that is at issue, privacy will
be seen variously to advance or deter emancipation, to cloak inequality or procure
equality.
173
The lesson, then, is to not treat the liberal virtue of privacy as a universal emancipatory
category but, rather, as one that has the ability to disenfranchise many sexual
rights agendas that consider, following Bentham, that publicity is at the very
heart of justice.
The privatization of emancipation in the NLO has also taken place in the
realm of other socio-economic rights such as education. Let me use two examples
from the world of advertisements and charity work to explain how this works. As
mentioned in Part I of this article, the right to education, which was originally a
170. Ashley J Tellis, "Nothing to celebrate about 377" Daily News &
Analysis (27 June 2010), online: <http://www.dnaindia.com/lifestyle/
comment nothing-to-celebrate-about-section-377_1401765>.
171. These are identity categories that non-elite, sexually marginalized men in India use instead of
the category of gay. Culturally, the performance of these identities is also very different from
being gay or only homosexual.
172. Jason Keith Fernandes, "The Dilemma after the Decision: Strays thoughts after Gay
Liberation" Tehelka (14 August 2009), online: <http:l/www.tehelka.com/story-main42.
asp?filename=Ws220809TheDilemma.asp>.
173. Brown, "Suffering," supra note 94 at 428.
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DP, has now been made justiciable though legislation and through its migration into
Part III of the Constitution (as Article 21A). A print advertisement that formed,
part of the hugely publicized Teach India (TI) campaign (launched in 2008 by
the Times of India, a private newspaper company and India's largest circulating
English daily) posed the question, "What is the perfect solution to illiteracy?"
In the next line there are two options: "Govt." and "You." The "Govt." option is
scratched out, and there is an affirmative tick mark beside "You." After this, the
advertisement goes on to detail how "You" can join the TI campaign to "help
change the future of a child forever." Choosing "You" over "Govt." can imply two
things. One is that the government is useless and that it has not been able to ensure
education for all children, which is why we should abandon the government and
take it upon ourselves to eradicate illiteracy. The other implication could be that
providing education to children is not something that the state should do at all
and that it is upon private actors-not just individual citizens, but corporate actors
and non-governmental entities-to impart education. This call by a corporate
entity sends out the message that the protection of children's rights (in this case
education) needs to be privatized. This advertising strategy "engage[s] its audience
aesthetically, with promises of pleasure and self-realization." 1 The pleasure being
offered is that of providing education to a hapless child, which benefits the
donor's sense of self-worth as well as the recipient child.
The question of the right to education is completely hollowed out, and
education for children turns solely into a matter of individualized compassionate
concern. The more you can arouse compassion, the more educated India's children
will become; it does not matter whether the right to education is a justiciable
right or not, nor whether the state is being held accountable or not. Of course, the
Times of India cannot be held accountable if it fails to provide universal edu-
cation. It is their compassionate gesture, outside of their profit-making concerns,
that makes them worthy of popular praise and raises their corporate goodwill.
This outsourced strategy of privatized and packaged emancipation fuels a thriving
compassion industry and creates a culture of impunity that allows the state, as
well as those who claim to replace the state, to do away with accountability.
Private capital's campaign to end inequality and discrimination has taken
another interesting turn and has given Emancipation 1 another dimension
altogether. An announcement on the matrimonial pages of the Times of India
appealed to advertisers to "drop social pre-conditions like caste, religion or
174. William Mazzarella, Shovelling Smoke: Advertising and Globalization in Contemporary India
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003) at 68.
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dowry requirements," in return for a 15 per cent discount on advertising rates.
Ostensibly, this move appears progressive. But it asks the potential advertiser
to privatize the practices of what Amarrya Sen calls "identity disregard," 7 ' the
implication being that in the consumptive markets of neo-liberalism, identities
don't matter-which, Sen notes, is a myth. What gets passed off as progressive in
the present instance is actually a move towards privatizing the practice of non-
discrimination as a public issue. For instance, some progressive-thinking liberal
person might believe strongly in the message that the advertisement is conveying and
accordingly drop identity-based marriage preconditions. But will the same person
support affirmative action as a state policy in private organizations in India? Identity
disregard, then, is a privatized issue of self-governance that necessarily has no
connection to ending structural prejudice-be it cultural, social, economic,
or sexual. Emancipation 1 seduces people to end discrimination through the
economic incentive of discounts. This is another dimension of the operation of
Emancipation 1, and it is at the heart of how the NLO functions.
VI. THE CURIOUS CASE OF HANS DEMBOWSKI
Judicial process and institution cannot be permitted to be scandalized or
subjected to contumacious violation in such a blatant manner... Vicious
stultification and vulgar debunking cannot be permitted to pollute the
stream ofjustice.176
In this penultimate Part, I share an anecdote about what happens when the spectacle
of emancipation is resisted and punctured. There could be very many ways of doing
this-perhaps, for example, by publicly burning copies of anti-poor judgments, taking
inspiration from Ambedkar's burning of the Manu Smriti1" at the Mahad Satyagraha in
Maharashtra in 1927. I, however, will examine a very benign form of resistance.
In 2001, German sociologist Hans Dembowski's book Taking the State to
Court. Public Interest Litigation and the Public Sphere in Metropolitan India..8 was
175. Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: WW Norton &
Company, 2006) at 20.
176. Narmada BachaoAndolan v Union of India and Ors, [1999] 4 SCR 5 at 3 (India), Anand J.
177. The Manu Smriti is an ancient Hindu religious text that lays down, among other things, the
operations of the caste system and the punishments for lower castes if they do not follow
their caste diktats. See Wendy Doniger & Brian K Smith, The Laws of Manu (London:
Penguin Books, 1991).
178. Hans Dembowski, Taking the State to Court: Public Interest Litigation and the Public Sphere in
Metropolitan India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), online: Asia House
<http:l/www.asienhaus.delpublic/archivlfaking-the-state_tocourt.pdf>.
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published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in India. Soon after its launch at
the 2001 Kolkata Book Fair, the Calcutta High Court started contempt-of-court
proceedings against Dembowski, the publisher, and others, and OUP discontin-
ued distribution of the book."9 To this day, the contempt proceedings have not
been heard, and the book has not been re-introduced into the market--despite
that fact that Dembowski apologized to the court. The book is, however, freely
downloadable on the Internet.'
In a 1999 order reprimanding Arundhati Roy for insulting the SC in her
essay "The Greater Common Good,"'' Justice Anand made it amply clear that
the court will not tolerate anyone polluting the "stream of justice." '182 So what
was in Dembowski's book that the court saw as having the potential to pollute?
Taking the State to Court is a dense sociological and ethnographic reading of
environmental cases in the Calcutta High Court. While a detailed discussion of the
contents of the book is beyond the scope of this article, suffice to say that apart from
the book's research being based in Kolkata and Howrah, its theoretical insights are
aimed at examining the relationships between civil society and the judiciary in
fashioning a public sphere. The book also provides a very useful sociological
discussion of the history of judicial activism in India. Until chapter six, the book
discusses various facets of the cases that it studies. It is in chapter seven that
Dembowski offers a more personalized ethnographic reading of judicial and court
culture in Kolkata. And this, it seems, was the central 'pollutant' for the court.
As Dembowski mentions in a paper that he presented at a conference at
Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, in 2008:
So why were some judges obviously unhappy with the book? The answer probably
lies in chapter 7, which moves on from "hard" case-study facts derived from court
orders, government plans and other written documents. Chapter 7 examines day-to-
day life in the High Court and civil society, including rumours of corruption. The
image that emerges of the High Court is one of an institution that does not enjoy
undivided popular trust. While this image may not be favourable, I would still insist
179. "Taking the State to Court?" Outlook India (18 June 2001), online: Outlook India <http://
www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?212107>.
180. For the full text of the book, see Hans Dembowski, Taking the State to Court: Public Interest
Litigation and the Public Sphere in Metropolitan India, online: <http://www.asienhaus.del
public/archiv/takingthe state to court.pdf>.
181. Outlook India (24 May 1999), online: <http:llwww.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?207509>
[Outlook India].
182. Prashant Bhusan, "Judges in their own cause-I" The Hindu (4 September 2001), online: The
Hindu <http://www.hindu.coml2001/09/04/stories/05042524.htm>.
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that it was true at the time and that my description would hardly seem unfair to
critical readers without personal stakes in the matter.
183
He concludes the book by stating, "Public Interest Litigation has, several times,
made a difference in people's immediate surroundings. While it does not provide
an easy road to official accountability and democratic deliberation, it does raise
hope for change."18 '
My reading of chapter seven does not provide me with any poisonously
pollutant material that can do any harm to the court's stream of justice or
injustice. In my view, what Dembowski has written does not qualify as contempt
under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.18 Rather, it falls squarely within the
exceptions of "fair and accurate report[ing]" and "fair criticism." '86 Yet the court's
censorious response to a book that did not in any militant way call the judiciary's
spectacular bluff is a brutal affront to academic and creative freedom in this
country. Is the spectacular facade of the judiciary so fragile that the only way it
can stop people from scratching its surface is by criminalizing them?
The curious case of Hans Dembowski brings home the fact that the
high court and the SC in India may use the spectre of contempt to muzzle
resistance to the spectacles of emancipation that judicial imagination manu-
factures for us.
It is apt to close this Part by quoting at length that part from Arundhati Roy's
"The Greater Common Good" that made her guilty of contempt, leading to a
day's incarceration:
I stood on a hill and laughed out loud
Why did I laugh?
Because I suddenly remembered the tender concern with which the Supreme Court
judges in Delhi (before vacating the legal stay on further construction of the Sardar
Sarovar Dam) had enquired whether tribal children in the resettlement colonies
would have children's parks to play in. The lawyers representing the government had
hastened to assure them that indeed they would, and, what's more, that there were
seesaws and slides and swings in every park. I looked up at the endless sky and down
183. Hans Dembowski, "Academic Freedom Only for the Online Avatar? - Calcutta High Court
Puts Limits on Sociological Debate" (Paper delivered at the LASSNet Inaugural Conference,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 10 January 2009), online:
<http://www.lassnet.org/2009/readings/dembowski2OO8academic-freedom.pdf> at 4.
184. Ibid at 211.
185. No 70 of 1971, India Code.
186. Ibid, ss 4-5.
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at the river rushing past and for a brief, brief moment the absurdity of it all reversed
my rage and I laughed. I meant no disrespect.'
87
VII.LETTING HOPE ELOPE WITH JUSTICE? A POETIC
DETOUR
Your courtroom turns into an ominous circus.
Two shows everyday, entry free. As the
High Priestess you let hope elope with justice...
And to make sure that you never turn blind,
Or bored, or fall asleep, each plaintiff applies
A paste of bloodred chillies on your open eyes18 8
I will end this article with a set of stray thoughts-a poetic detour of sorts-that
will provide hopeful glimpses of what Emancipation 2, as I imagine it, might
look like. Detours are necessary, as they allow us to traverse uncharted paths to
arrive at our favoured destinations. Sometimes detours make us re-imagine our
destinations and lead us to places that we did not plan to go to. Detours are
inevitable in any ethical voyage because our journeys are concerned not just with
the destination but also with every bit of the journey itself, which is why I think
it is apt to begin the concluding Part of this article by sharing Naxal ideologue
and poet Srijan Sen's poem "Das Kapital": 185
Karl Marx wrote "Das Kapital".
His readers swelled their own capital.
The lessons that they drew from his pages ...
Was invested in building palaces.
Then they made the profound assertion:
"Das Kapital" needs full "revision"!
Through a cruel joke, Sen points at a paradox that is embedded in ideas and texts
that promise emancipation. As a committed Marxist, I am deeply appreciative
of Sen's provocation because it forces me to think of detours-not to abandon
Marxism, but to rethink the paths that have lead to the profound assertion that
Das Kapital needs full revision.
187. Outlook India, supra note 181.
188. Meena Kandasamy, Ms Military (New Delhi: Navayana Publishing, 2010) at 28-29
189. Srijan Sen, "Das Kapital" in Sumanta Banerjee, ed, Thema Book of Naxalite Poetry (Kolkata:
Ihema, 2009) 72 at 72.
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This poem for me is not one that denounces Marxism; rather, it calls for
a more rigorous engagement with it. It cautions us about unquestioningly
believing in the political emancipation promised by the liberal incantations
of constitutionalism. The poem urges us to interrogate rights as constitutive of
oppressive systems of power rather than as a body of knowledge or a tactic of
management that is outside of it.
Judicial pronouncements are also texts of emancipation, and they hold the
cruel capacity to unleash brutal violence. As Robert M. Cover states:
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. ... A judge articulates
her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property,
his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for vio-
lence which has already occurred or which is about to occur. When interpreters have
finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn
apart by these organized, social practices of violence. Neither legal interpretation
nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one another.
190
What is required, then, is a re-imagining of emancipation by searching for
and archiving material practices of being that embody insurrectionary knowledge:
knowledge that brings an understanding of rights as embodied practices of
resistance that disturb the linear trajectories of constitutional narratives of eman-
cipation; and knowledge that reproduces the magic of modernity and normalizes
inequality. What comes to mind from the recent history of contemporary India
is the July 2004 protest outside the headquarters of the Assam Rifles in Imphal,
the capital of the northeastern state of Manipur, where groups of middle-aged
women, stripped naked, shouted slogans and carried banners that read, "Indian
Army Rape Us!" The protest was a spontaneous response to the arbitrary abduction,
rape, and murder of Manorama Devi by the armed forces on mere suspicion
of being an insurgent.' 9' What does the corporeality of this protest do to our
constitutional morality in a location where the law has been central to the
normalization of state violence? The violent letter of the law (the Armed Forces
Special Powers Act, 1956"2 ), which allows the army to kill on suspicion, and the
fragility of our spectacular hope in constitutional protection was powerfully
190. "Violence and the Word" (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1601.
191. Teresa Rehman, "Why I screamed, rape us, take our flesh" Tehelka Magazine (31
May 2008), online: Tehelka Magazine <http://www.tehelka.com/story-main39.
asp?filename=Ne3lO5O8rape us-our flesh.asp> and Human Rights Watch, "These Fellows
Must be Eliminated: Relentless Violence and Impunity in Manipur" (29 September
2008), online: Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/09/29/
these-fellows-must-be-eliminated>.
192. No 28 of 1958, India Code.
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shattered by the protest that questioned not only the perverse masculinity of the
state but also the very structure of the law that perpetuates the state's monopoly
over violence through constitutional sanction. 193
Do we abandon Emancipation 1? Where do we look for Emancipation 2?
How can we stop hope from eloping with justice? Nivedita Menon provides an
inspirational direction:
I'understand emancipation as a process without closure, it is not a goal that we can
reach. Each victory becomes the site of a fresh cooptation, but conversely too, each
defeat releases new potential to resist oppression. To move away from legal and
state-centered conceptions of political practice is to recognize political practice as
the perpetual attempt to eliminate oppression rather than the achievement of this
elimination. Nevertheless "emancipation" remains a horizon that should drive our
political practice.' 
9
'
Emancipation 2 thus lies in the contested cultures of the quotidian, the cacophonous
politics of the street, and the mundane negotiations of the everyday and ordinary,
or what Asef Bayat calls "nonmovements": "the collective endeavors of millions of
non collective actors, carried out in the main squares, back streets, court houses,
or communities." 9 ' Emancipation 2 is about the unrelenting journeys full of
detours for finding new meanings for our human condition beyond greed and
civilizational domination.
I will end, finally, with another poem. This one is called "Right" and is written
by Naxal poet Cherabandaraju: 19 6
I will not stop cutting down trees
Though there's life in them.
I will not stop plucking out leaves,
Though they make nature beautiful.
I will not stop hacking off branches
Though they are the hands of a tree.
Because-
I need a hut.
193. Despite the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 that established the National Human Rights
Commission, section 19 of the Act denies the NHRC any authority to investigate into human
rights violations by the armed forces. The NHRC, on receipt of any complaint can only seek
a report on the alleged violation from the central government. Protection of Human Rights Act,
1993, No 10 of 1994, India Code.
194. Menon, supra note 70 at 20 [emphasis in original].
195. Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2009) at ix.
196. In Banerjee, supra note 189, 62.
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Our constitutional rights vocabulary is woefully inadequate in responding
to this deeply unsettling paradox. I, for one, would unflinchingly support the
extension of Cherabandaraju's poem to a hypothetical but altogether conceiyable
claim by a company that we must keep hacking down trees "... because - we need
a factory." I can imagine the company going on to wax eloquent about how the
factory will help people build concrete houses, hospitals, and schools. Huts-they
are primitive! Their prototypes can adorn exotic resorts that are built by cutting
down trees in forests, destroying beaches, defacing hills, and displacing people, but
'real' huts, and the real people who inhabit them, should become extinct.
In the second half of 2011, while the state was caught in one of modern India's
most complicated governance crises-that of governmental corruption-the SC
restored some hope. A most unexpected spectacular moment came on 5 July 2011,
when the SC, hearing a petition on human rights violations carried out by a civilian
group called Salwa Judum,'97 ordered that the vigilante civilian group be disbanded
and declared that it was unconstitutional on the part of the state of Chattisgargh to
carry out, in the name of fighting Maoism, armed operations that resulted in grave
violations of human rights of poor tribal peoples.'98 In a rare acknowledgement of
the devastating consequences of neo-liberal economic policies of the state and, in
particular, the mining industries, the SC noted in unambiguous terms:
The culture of unrestrained selfishness and greed spawned by modern neo-liberal
economic ideology, and the false promises of ever increasing spirals of consumption
leading to economic growth that will lift everyone, under-grid this socially, politi-
cally and economically unsustainable set of circumstances in vast tracts of India ....
Predatory forms of capitalism, supported and promoted by the State in direct con-
travention of constitutional norms and values, often take deep roots around the
extractive industries.1
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Most of us on the left of the ideological spectrum praised the judgment,
and we celebrated the achievements of those who fought the legal battle and
of those who have bravely resisted the state's violence in Chattisgargh and
other places in India where mining industries have devastated the lives and
livelihoods of poor Indigenous populations. This was a classic instance of left
legalism's triumph.
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This seemed like a repeat of the act of historical rectification that the
SC carried out in the wake of the Emergency. Our faith in the law, like Ustad
Mangu's, was seemingly restored. But the celebration was temporary. On 18
November 2011, in response to a challenge to the SC order by the state, the
Court clarified that the ban on Special Police Offers and the declaration that they
were unconstitutional were confined to the state of Chattisgargh.5 0 There was
hardly any questioning of this shift in the SC's stand that can now, in effect, allow
the state to replicate the formation of vigilante groups in other parts of India
ostensibly facing the Maoist threat. The spectacle of the SC's strong indictment
against neo-liberalism-induced state violence was ultimately truncated.
In November 2011, the Chattisgargh government declared that it had
complied with the SC judgment and had disbanded all SPOs. On 26 January
2012, India's Republic Day was celebrated to mark the anniversary of the 1950
adoption of the Constitution of India. On the same day, the President honored
Ankit Garg, a police officer from Chattisgargh, with a gallantry medal for his
relentless fight against left-wing extremism in the state. Ankit Garg has been
accused of torturing and sexually abusing Soni Sori, a tribal school teacher from
Dantewada who is in custody for allegedly having Maoist links. Sori has alleged
that Garg watched as junior police personnel stripped her naked, administered
electric shocks, and assaulted her: 'According to her lawyers, a medical examination
found two stones in Ms. Soni's genital tract and another in her rectum."2 1
New constitution, new constitution ... What am I talking about? It is the
same old constitution.
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